

SOUTH AFRICA
1652-1933

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SOUTH AFRICA

1652–1933

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CHAPTER I

THE COUNTRY AND ITS INHABITANTS

THE greater part of Africa south of the Zambezi consists of an elevated plateau, which rarely falls below the 4,000-feet contour line. This vast tableland was once an inland sea. Its eastern and southern rim, the great range of the Drakensberg, is responsible for the aridity of the climate, for it intercepts the moist winds blowing from the Indian Ocean. There are no considerable lakes, and few navigable rivers. Vegetation in the dry season is scanty. The air, on the other hand, is invigorating, and the climate, even on the lower terraces many thousand feet below the central plateau, is favourable for European settlement. Yet South Africa is sparsely populated by people of European origin. Before the seventeenth century it was utterly neglected as a field for colonization. This has been largely due to geographical facts. Until com-

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paratively recent times, southern Africa has been far removed from the seaways of commerce and empire. The difficulty of access from a coastline singularly devoid of good harbours has further contributed to delay exploration and settlement.

South Africa is a country with a long prehistoric past. Darwin believed that Africa was the cradle of the human race. Many considerations point to north Africa as the original home of modern man, or *homo sapiens*. The climatic deterioration which converted the originally fertile region of the Sahara into a desert drove *homo sapiens* (neanthropic man) north, east and south into regions of greater rainfall. The great attraction of southern and eastern Africa lay in the more equable climate, with consequent abundance of food supplies. Archaeological discoveries prove that man was supporting life in South Africa at a very remote date. They also suggest a cultural continuity which suffered no appreciable break from climatic variations. South Africa is a land of unrivalled richness for the anthropological student. Stone implements characteristic of every link in the chain of human evolution have been found in abundance over the greater

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part of the present Union. These tools bear some resemblance to the flint implements of prehistoric western Europe, attributable to common ancestry. They are, however, much more strikingly similar to the stone age cultures of southern India. Both are probably variants of a parent theme originating, it may be, in the Near East.

The peculiar feature of South African prehistory is its long duration forward into quite recent times. Written records begin to illuminate the progress of man in Egypt and Mesopotamia in the fourth millennium B.C. In South Africa, the prehistoric era terminated scarcely three hundred years ago. The early seventeenth century of the modern era, the period of Cromwell and Richelieu, was still the stone age for Africa, south of the Zambezi. No bronze or copper age separates this period from the present age of iron and steel; and when first European visitors began to reveal the sub-Continent in the period of the great geographical discoveries, Bushman and Hottentot were still fashioning implements of quartz and shale. Tools resembling those of palæolithic cultures in western Europe may be of quite recent date.

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The earliest South Africans were hunters unacquainted with agriculture or domesticated animals. The most primitive stone implements found in the Cape Province, and belonging to the so-called Lower Stellenbosch culture, suggest a low standard of capacity, hardly superior to that of river-drift man in more northerly climes. These, and succeeding tools, belong to a geological period when arid conditions alternated with pluvial. The geological history of the Union has been imperfectly surveyed, but it seems probable that the face of South Africa has undergone considerable changes since Pleistocene times. Human advances were registered in the mild intervals between periods of utter aridity and excessively moist phases. The neanthropic invaders from the originally moist Sahara may have reached the Limpopo River about 6500 B.C. Finds of more specialized tools with polished edges are conjecturally associated with their arrival. These new-comers were presumably the immediate precursors of the Bushmen.

Very little is known of these early peoples. It is the opinion of Dr. R. Broom, the well-known palaeontologist,

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that the present-day Koranna is the somewhat degenerate descendant of the people whose stone implements have been found in abundance at Douglas and Barkly West in the gravels of the Vaal River terraces. Koranna skulls certainly bear a marked resemblance to the fossilized skull found at Springbok flats in 1929. The Springbok skull is that of a tall, muscularly-strong and large-brained man. His descendants were presumably strong enough gradually to expel from the more fertile areas of the sub-Continent the smaller statured race, of which the so-called Boskop man was a very early representative. Centuries of under-nutrition produced from this type the earliest Bushmen.

At the dawn of written history, Bushmen had probably been in occupation of the country for several thousand years. Their progress in the arts of civilization has been conspicuously slow. Even in the eighteenth century they were unacquainted with pastoral life and dependent on stone tools. Most of the later stone age cultures mark the settlement of groups of Bushmen, sometimes doubtless after intermixture with earlier groups.

The Bushmen appear to have drifted

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south from an original home in north Africa. The distribution of their rock paintings suggests a wide settlement over southern Africa. A nomadic people devoted to hunting, they lived in small groups of not more than one hundred persons, based on the monogamous family. Several groups formed a clan or tribe, under a chief, but primitive communism allowed little scope for the exercise of personal authority. Despite their nomadic mode of life and entire inability to assimilate the culture of more advanced peoples, the Bushmen possessed a rare gift for naturalistic painting, which has adorned caves and rock shelters over a wide area with polychrome studies of rare artistic merit.

At the time when European settlement began at the Cape, the Bushmen were already being dispossessed of their hunting-grounds in South Africa by the stronger and more numerous Hottentots. These people were probably the descendants of Hamitic folk occupying the region of the Great Lakes, where they intermingled with the Bushmen. Moving south many centuries later, the Hottentots entered the present Union, either by way of the Upper

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Zambezi and the West Coast, or, under pressure from the Bantu, through the coastlands of Natal and the eastern Cape. By the close of the sixteenth century A.D., Hottentot clans were in occupation of the western Cape, and had begun to drive the physically inferior Bushmen northward and eastward towards the advancing Bantu.

The Hottentots were essentially a pastoral people, with some knowledge of metals, but lacking in the artistic gift of their predecessors. They were never a compact race. Individual clans recognized little more than the honorary precedence of the tribal chieftain, whilst the conduct of the affairs of the group rested with the elders. Nomadic habits were rooted in the necessity for finding pastureage for their large herds of cattle in an ill-watered land. Agriculture was regarded with aversion.

Closely following the Hottentots, and using the route via the Great Lakes, came the Bantu peoples, a composite group belonging to a single linguistic family, but with local variations of skin colour. The Bantu type of language presumably originated in east-Central Africa, at some remote

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period at least two thousand years ago, and long after the penetration into northern equatorial Africa of Hamitic folk from Egypt and Arabia. The Bantu peoples are predominantly negroes, with Caucasian (Hamitic) strains, and presenting many local divergencies from type, derived from intermixture with peoples with whom they were brought into contact.

From this original equatorial home, a very gradual movement southward on a broad front began about the commencement of the Christian era. Not until a thousand years ago did Bantu tribes begin seriously to dispute with Hottentots and Bushmen the possession of Africa south of the Zambezi. It is conjectured that they came early into contact with the unknown workers of Zimbabwe and adjacent gold-mining areas. The problem of the Zimbabwe ruins is too difficult and controversial to be discussed in these pages. If a comparatively recent date, such as A.D. 1100, be accepted for the construction of the Zimbabwe ruins, it becomes possible that they were built and used by the Bantu, and not by Semitic traders from the north. Some writers find it difficult to believe

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that Bantu workmanship was capable of designing and erecting stone buildings of this description. But the architectural features of Zimbabwe are those of Bantu buildings of a later age, and Bantu pottery has been found beneath the floor inside the acropolis wall. The latest research supports the view that the ruins are of comparatively recent date, perhaps post-mediæval ; and that the Makalanga Bantu, if they did not actually build Zimbabwe, at any rate occupied the workings and, assisted by Semitic overseers, extracted gold from the adjacent mine shafts.

Beyond the Limpopo River, the Bantu advance met with more formidable resistance. The waterless districts to the southwest imposed a natural obstacle, and helped to divert the main stream of migration in a south-easterly direction. Towards the close of the sixteenth century, Bantu people began to occupy Natal. These were the advance-guard of the Zulu-Xosa section of the Bantu, a section divided politically into a large number of distinct tribes. Farther west, the central section, gradually penetrating through fierce Hottentot and Bushmen resistance,

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occupied the high plateau north of the Orange River and to the west of the Drakensberg Mountains. Along the East Coast, Xosa hunting-parties established contact with Dutch cattle dealers about the commencement of the eighteenth century. Forty years later they had cleared the Hottentots from their path and reached the area of the Fish River bush. The year 1778 is usually held to mark the clash of European settlement proceeding eastward from the Cape Peninsula with this earliest wave of Bantu invasion.

European occupation of South Africa dates from the middle of the seventeenth century. The establishment of a Dutch settlement at the Cape was roughly contemporaneous with the effective occupation by the Bantu of Natal. The arrival of the white man in South Africa was an incident in the process of world discovery and commercial expansion which marks off modern times from the Middle Ages. Apart from the Mediterranean littoral, the continent of Africa had long been an unknown land to the inhabitants of western Europe. In the later centuries of the mediæval era, improvements in shipbuilding, and in the art of navigation, pre-

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pared the way for exploration of the coasts of Africa. In this process the Portuguese were the pioneers. By 1446 they had discovered the Cape Verde Islands. Some forty years later, Bartholomew Diaz had rounded the southern cape. The circumnavigation of southern Africa opened the way for Portuguese monopoly of the eastern trade, and foreshadowed the future importance of the Cape as the key to India. In 1497 da Gama sighted the Bluff, which shelters the port of Natal, naming the surrounding coastlands *Terra Natalis*, before he proceeded on the journey across the Indian Ocean which was destined to lay the foundations of Portuguese dominion in the East.

Competition in eastern commerce came first from the Dutch. In 1580 Spain had annexed the Portuguese dominions. In the northern Netherlands, however, Spanish rule had been repudiated. The sturdy merchants and sailors of Holland and Zealand were quick to challenge the asserted monopoly of the Catholic Powers over the new areas of trade and maritime expansion. Before the century closed, Dutch merchants had made their way round the Cape and journeyed across the

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Indian Ocean to Java and Sumatra. On the West Coast of Africa they displaced the Portuguese and established themselves strongly in the Gulf of Guinea and at Angola. So profitable were these sea-going ventures that Dutch capital and enterprise flowed into the trade with the East. The organization (1602) of the Dutch East India Company guaranteed the financial stability and the administrative control required for successful prosecution of commerce with these remote islands of the Malay Archipelago. The Dutch had fought their way to the Spice Islands, in the face of determined Portuguese resistance, and they were resolved to forestall the rivalry of other nations. The decision to build up a monopoly of the eastern traffic accounts for the Dutch attempt, in the first half of the seventeenth century, to secure the approaches to India. They founded a port of call on the island of Mauritius and took temporary possession of St. Helena. By 1640 they had secured a footing in Ceylon. From an early date, settlement had been contemplated at the Cape of Good Hope, but reports had been unfavourable to its selection as a port of call for vessels.

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engaged on the eastern trade. The roadstead in Table Bay gave no secure shelter from north-west gales, whilst the Hottentot inhabitants were reputed to be treacherous and inhospitable. Dutch and English vessels occasionally visited Table Bay in search of fresh meat and water, and its ultimate occupation by one or other of the Powers engaged in the Indian trade was inevitable. The voyage from European ports to India and Batavia imposed a strain on the crews of vessels which could only be alleviated by the establishment of a refreshment station. Prevailing winds and currents dictated choice of the Cape for such a settlement, and it only needed the favourable report (1648) of a party of shipwrecked seamen from the *Haarlem* to convince the Dutch East India Company that the regular provisioning of their ocean-going ships could best be provided from a depot established on the shores of Table Bay. Accordingly, in April 1652, three small vessels dropped anchor in the open roadstead. The history of European settlement in southernmost Africa begins with the landing from the *Goede Hoop* of Surgeon Jan van Riebeeck and his followers.

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Those who landed with van Riebeeck were a mixed party, for the most part of Dutch or German birth, and all of them servants of the Company recruited in the Netherlands. They were reinforced, during the first century of the infant settlement, by the arrival of colonists from France, Germany and Holland—never more than a thin trickle, but sufficient gradually to transform what had been no more than a refreshment station into a genuine colony. Common devotion to Calvinism facilitated the process of amalgamation as between Dutchman and French Huguenot, but the racial problems of the country had been further complicated by the decision to import slaves. Negro and Bantu slaves were recruited from Mozambique and the West Coast, but there was also a class of Asiatic offenders, despatched from India and the Far East to serve a term of slavery at the Cape. Illicit union between European farmers and slave women produced a new race of half-breeds. At the same time, the Hottentots, becoming rapidly detribalized through contact with the white man, mixed their blood with Bantu, Bushman and European. Racial admixture

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thus produced the Griqua, or Cape Coloured, people.

Behind the confines of the settlement, as we have already seen, masses of vigorous Bantu tribesmen were steadily pressing south, driving before them the remnants of the less virile Bushmen and partially absorbing the Hottentots.

Already before the coming of the British, South Africa was thus a land of acute racial problems.

The addition of the British element introduced a new factor making for disunity. A decided cleavage appeared within the European community, based on distinctive traditions and inherited outlook. The eighteenth century had fused Dutch, Huguenot French and German into a more or less homogeneous stock, with a common language and common experience. But the British came to South Africa as a politically dominant race; and the strong individuality of the national character and traditions of the two peoples stood in the way of any easy absorption of British and Dutch in a common South African citizenship. The final attainment of nationhood in the twentieth century is however no more

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than preparatory to the essential task of founding a community wherein European, Asiatic and African may live together in harmony and mutual co-operation.

CHAPTER II

COMPANY RULE AT THE CAPE

THE discovery and occupation of the Cape of Good Hope came about during the process of penetration of unknown seas for purposes of trade. During the later Middle Ages, Europe had depended for her luxuries largely on Arab merchants employing the devious caravan routes between Europe and the Far East. The desire to open a direct trade with eastern countries, and so make a breach in the monopoly held by the Arabs, formed the principal motive for sixteenth-century exploration. Discovery of the sea route to India brought first the Portuguese, and later Dutch, English and French merchants into direct contact with the sources of eastern traffic.

In the establishment of a chain of dependencies along the route to India, the Dutch revealed their faculty for recognizing the strategic positions of trade.

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Before the close of the weary struggle with Spain, they had accumulated the capital resources and derived the administrative experience which gave them the foremost place in the commercial enterprise of the seventeenth century. That enterprise was directed into narrow channels by the prevailing mercantilist thought. Militant nationalism had been the not unnatural outcome of the political and social changes of the Reformation era. In the succeeding period, statesmen were concerned to reinforce the political independence of the national state by securing its economic self-sufficiency. With this object in view, they sought to promote foreign trade, which gave employment to ships and men, and led to an influx of gold and silver, through the profitable sale of foreign commodities. The consequent accumulation of treasure would safeguard the political independence of the country and increase the prosperity of its inhabitants, in proportion as it weakened the resources of rival nations.

These mercantilist notions were nowhere more strongly held than in the great trading towns of the United Provinces. By developing to the utmost the trade

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with the Far East, the Dutch hoped to establish the prosperity and strength of their country. This could not be promoted by colonization, but only, it was thought, by the commercial exploitation of dependencies. Trading profit thus became the sole consideration, though the ultimate object of the trade was national, rather than individual, gain, national power being held to be contingent on a flourishing oversea commerce.

In the seventeenth century, the favourite method of regulating foreign trade was that of the chartered company. The Dutch East India Company was the most powerful trading corporation in the world. Its directors were leading members of the States General, whilst its shares were distributed among every province and every class. Invested with full powers of sovereignty in the East, the Company treated on equal terms with native potentates, declared war and peace, and established its factories at strategic points along the route to India. Its empire was a series of small trading stations, each with its establishment of merchants and soldiers, and designed to forward the central object of maintenance of the Company's profits.

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Before the foundation of the settlement at the Cape, the Company was supreme in the Spice Islands of the Malay Archipelago. To protect the commercial monopoly which it had built up at great expense, and could maintain only at the cost of heavy standing charges for fortifications and factories, it proposed rigidly to control the production and sale of the cloves, nutmegs and other valuable products of the islands, resisting by force the intrusion of other nations.

The Cape was a relatively unimportant link in the Company's chain of outposts. Territorial dominion was at no time the object of the Dutch. Unlike the English in North America, they concentrated on commercial aims, and when circumstances forced them to assume sovereignty, they were careful to restrict their responsibilities. Whilst political and religious motives were inducing Englishmen of all classes, but especially the small gentry and yeomen among whom Puritanism had taken root, to seek new homes in America, the predominant motive of Dutch settlement was commercial. The trading outposts of the Dutch East India Company were never regarded as colonies. There

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was no question of local self-government, or of freedom of economic development. At the Cape, the Company was prepared to do only what was strictly necessary in the interests of its trading monopoly, and its autocratic administration left no room for genuine self-determination.

Van Riebeeck's instructions were to build a fort, plant a garden and cultivate good relations with the natives. Above all, he was to keep expenditure as low as possible. The Company desired a station where its ships could obtain fresh provisions and its seamen recuperate after the hardships of the voyage. Meat was to be secured by friendly barter with the natives, but it was hoped that grain and vegetables would be forthcoming from the labour of the Company's servants. Official farming, however, was not a success, and the importation of corn from the East proved to be expensive. Averse as they were to European colonization, the directors concluded that the most economical plan was to settle free burghers on farms, which they could cultivate for their own advantage and for the Company's profit. Accordingly in 1657 and subsequent years, servants of the Company received their

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discharge, and were permitted to take up land to the north and east of the Table Bay settlement. These settlers were indeed "free" only in a very limited sense. They were compelled to supply meat, corn, and wine to the Company at its own price, and they were strictly to abstain from disposing of their surplus produce to visiting ships until the fourth day after their arrival in the roadstead.

Until 1679, the settlement made little headway. The cattle trade with the Hottentots was intermittent and precarious, and the total agricultural output insufficient for the needs of the Company. At the same time, there was cause for anxiety in the outbreak of hostilities in Europe between the United Provinces and Louis XIV. Van Riebeeck had stipulated that the free burghers should do garrison duty, but they were not yet numerous. The Company appreciated the necessity for strengthening its hold on the "frontier fortress" of the East.

The new policy of colonization was introduced at the Cape largely for military reasons, but also because the agricultural undertakings of the Company had proved expensive and unsatisfactory. The direc-

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tors hoped by means of assisted emigration to the Cape to promote agriculture and industry and also to make possible a reduction in the numbers of the garrison. As their instrument in this new policy they chose Simon van der Stel, and despatched him to the Cape with instructions to extend the area of cultivation and free settlement.

Van der Stel hastened to lay out a new village (Stellenbosch) in the fertile valley of the Eerste River, and to encourage servants of the Company to take up farms. His chief work, however, was the settlement along the Berg River of close on two hundred French Huguenot refugees (1689–94). He was strongly in favour of a concentrated agricultural settlement, foreseeing embarrassment to the Company from the tendency of the cattle farmer to move away from headquarters into the interior. The coming of the Huguenots was an opportunity to introduce more scientific and intensive agriculture. This, he thought, could be best promoted by the scattering of French families among the homesteads of the Dutch, an expedient which would also facilitate the absorption of the new-comers within the older com-

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munity. The policy of official discouragement of the French language led to some friction in the early years of the settlement, but intermarriage was common, and in another generation distinctions of nationality were lost. As a result largely of the Huguenot immigration, the free burgher population had risen to 1,000 before the close of the seventeenth century.

The progress of agricultural settlement under Simon van der Stel encouraged the Company to abandon its own farming operations, and to look exclusively to the burghers for the supply of provisions for its garrison and ships. Even the cattle trade with the natives was finally surrendered. When in 1699 Simon retired from the government, the Cape had ceased to be purely a trading station and was in fair way to become a flourishing agricultural colony. Beyond the capital town there now lay a closely settled belt of farms in fertile country which van der Stel had begun to beautify by extensive oak planting. In the small villages of Stellenbosch, Paarl, Drakenstein and Fransch Hoek, orchards and vineyards testified to the enlargement of economic production under the fostering care of the Governor. Be-

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yond the settled belt the more restless and enterprising farmers had begun to cross the mountain barriers, foreshadowing the threefold division of the eighteenth-century community into the trading and official element at the capital town, the corn and wine farmers of the settled south-west and the semi-nomadic cattle farmers, who were the pioneers of European settlement in the unknown lands to the north and east.

The early years of the eighteenth century represent the prosperous days of the Cape settlement. The single-storied, reed-thatched houses of van Riebeeck's day were now largely rebuilt, the rooms being paved with red tiles, and raised stoeps added, flanked by stone benches. New buildings were usually double storied with ornate gables and multi-paned windows. In the living-rooms, frescoed walls and carved wainscoting distinguished the dwellings of well-to-do burghers, whilst teak and ebony imported from the East competed with local stinkwood as material for the furniture maker. Separate from the house stood the coach-house, stables and quarters for the owner's slaves.

The period of assisted emigration came

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to an end in 1707. European colonization was discredited in the eyes of the directors through the political and economic difficulties which had followed the departure of Simon van der Stel. The Company had resolved to abandon its wheat-growing and stock-raising operations in favour of the farmers, but it could not bring itself to permit any invasion of its trading monopoly. Its own interests as purchaser stood in the way of any concession to the farmers of the right to sell their produce at competitive prices, whilst the leases for the retail sale of certain commodities, which the Company put up to annual auction, represented a considerable item in the local revenue. Yet freedom of trade was grievously hampered by this policy of monopoly, whilst the frequency of shipwrecks made Table Bay an unpopular resort for ships' crews. Before the close of Simon van der Stel's rule, production had outrun supply, and under his son, Willem Adriaan, the livelihood of the burghers was rendered even more precarious through the competition of the Governor and his friends. Van der Stel was himself in possession at Vergelegen and Hottentots Holland of large tracts

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of fertile land, and, beyond the mountains in the Breede valley, he owned several cattle stations. For the cultivation of his arable land he could employ the Company's white artisans and some 300 slaves. That the younger van der Stel was an enterprising and successful farmer who was responsible for a considerable increase in the cultivable area at the Cape may be admitted. But the Company had expressly forbidden its officials to engage in agriculture. In defiance of this prohibition, Willem Adriaan, with his brother Frans and a small group of favoured officials, controlling between them one-third of the cultivated lands of the settlement, proceeded to supply the restricted Cape market with nearly everything which it needed. At the same time, van der Stel secured for his friends the most lucrative contracts for the supply of particular commodities.

The burghers could not compete under such unfair conditions. Exasperated by the inability to market their produce, they determined to appeal to the authorities in Amsterdam. Their leader was Adam Tas, a young Hollander who had come to the Cape as a free burgher in 1697. Tas's

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superior education led to his selection as secretary of the malcontent burghers, and in 1705 a petition, drawn up by Tas and signed by sixty-three farmers, was smuggled out of the colony on its way to Batavia. The Batavian Government forwarded the appeal to Amsterdam and sent a copy to the Cape for Willem Adriaan's perusal. Tas was promptly arrested, and lodged in the Castle. Deportations followed. An effort was made by the Governor to rally public opinion among the townsfolk in his support. But the directors, after impartial investigation, could come to only one conclusion. In 1707 they recalled van der Stel, expelled his brother Frans, and reiterated their commands that officials were not to trade in cattle, corn and wine. Subject to the Company's trading monopoly, burghers were to be free to sell their meat and grain where they wished.

The misgovernment of van der Stel had hastened the fusion of Dutch and French. Roughly one-half of the memorialists had been Frenchmen. Tas and his friends, thanks to the persistent animosity of Willem Adriaan towards the "boeren," had been able to count on the unanimous

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support of the agricultural community. This new-found solidarity among the farmers was the most notable consequence of the van der Stel episode.

At the same time, the victory of the burghers involved a definite setback to the policy of colonization. In 1707 the directors abandoned their plans for assisted European immigration, and began earnestly to consider the alternative policy of servile coloured labour. Slaves had been imported from Angola and the Guinea Coast so early as 1658, but it was not until the early years of the eighteenth century that the directors came to the definite conclusion that European labourers were less useful and more expensive in farm work than the coloured man. Hitherto, the Cape slave had been largely a household servant or a semi-skilled artisan permitted to employ his skill for his own advantage, as well as for the profit of his master. Europeans were still largely engaged as farm-hands. But the economic depression of the second decade led to gloomy forebodings as to the future of the settlement. Governor de Chavonnes and his Council (with the honourable exception of the Governor's brother

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Dominique) could see no future for the Cape as a colony resting on free white labour. Despite the imposition of new taxes, expenditure still vastly exceeded revenue, and farmers could not be prosperous so long as they were denied freedom of trade with Madagascar and other adjacent parts. They could not afford to export their produce to Batavia to be sold for what it could fetch, and the only practicable means of advancing their prosperity seemed to be to reduce the costs of production. This end, the Council suggested, could be achieved by the substitution of slaves for European labourers. Not only did the white man cost three to four times as much in wages and food, but he was addicted to idleness and could not be relied upon to render willing obedience.

The advice of de Chavonnes and his Council (1717) determined the economic structure of the settlement. Reinforced henceforth by no more than a thin trickle of voluntary immigration, the Cape turned unavoidably to slave labour. The increased employment of slaves soon brought the consequences which the far-sighted Dominique de Chavonnes had foretold.

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So early as 1743, Governor-General van Imhoff, visiting the Cape, found that the use of black labour involved the payment of excessively high wages to European workmen, whilst it bred an attitude of contempt towards all manual labour. "Having imported slaves, every common or ordinary European becomes a gentleman, and prefers to be served rather than to serve." Moreover, the extensive employment of slaves led to the investment of capital in property which, in days of heavy mortality from smallpox and other diseases, was peculiarly liable to total loss.

As the century wore on, stagnation of trade increased, rather than lessened. The Cape market continued to be fenced in by the regulations of the Company. Its very gradual improvement was offset by a distinct decline in the Company's oversea trade. The directors could not afford to pay their officials adequate salaries. The inevitable consequence was the adoption by officials of illegal private trading. Despite the strictest precautions, goods were smuggled into the settlement, there to be disposed of at retail prices from the private residences of officials. Even spices could generally be bought

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surreptitiously in the town at prices lower than those charged by the Company. Illicit trade of this nature made it possible for others besides officials to make a fairly comfortable living, but its prevalence, together with the high scale of charges for the accommodation and entertainment of strangers, gave the Cape a bad reputation among seamen and travellers.

The failing fortunes of the Company were reflected in the decreasing frequency with which ships called at the roadstead. The conclusion of the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) had been followed by a temporary increase in the total of calls. After 1730 numbers became stationary, with a tendency to decrease. In the winter months, when the north-west wind was blowing, mariners found Simon's Bay a safer roadstead. There were, however, years of prosperity at the capital city, notably during the American War, when France was a friendly power and French ships in the Bay made Cape Town a "little Paris." The growing demand for Cape wheat in the East was a fillip to trade, and, though Dutch ships were infrequently seen, this was partly compensated for by a rise in the number of English and French vessels

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putting into the Bay. But though the Company made a good profit out of the export of Cape grain to Batavia, it was not in a position to relieve the necessities of the farmers. It ceased to pay a dividend after 1782, and an ominous feature of the situation was the appearance at the Cape of convertible paper money. Conscientious Governors like Hendrik Swellengrebel (1739–51) and Ryk Tulbagh (1751–71) had done what they could to make conditions tolerable by suppressing private trading and official malversation, but the Company reduced the price at which it bought grain from the farmers, and resolutely refused to permit the disposal of their produce to strangers without the sanction of the Fiscal. Even Cape Town could not be genuinely prosperous whilst economic stagnation prevailed in the country. Life might be easy and spacious for some, inasmuch as menial work was performed by slaves, but the majority had to struggle hard for a living, and visitors noticed the significant fact that, save for the Governor and a few higher officials, nearly everyone took in paying guests.

The revolt of the American colonists against the colonial system of a European

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power was not unnoticed at the Cape. The grievances of the Americans were largely constitutional in character, and their demand for representation, as the only legitimate basis for taxation, found a ready echo at the Cape. From the days of van Riebeeck government had lacked any popular or representative element. Legislative and executive powers lay with the Governor (he had been styled "Commander" prior to 1691) advised by the Council of Policy. Both Governor and Council were no more than the local representatives of the Dutch East India Company, and were under instructions to refer weighty matters to the Company's "Council of India," which sat at Batavia to administer the affairs of all the eastern dependencies. Moreover, the Governor was liable at any time to be superseded in his functions by visiting officials of higher rank. For the administration of justice, the Council sat as a "Court of Justice," with certain additions to its membership, one or more "burgher councillors" attending when cases which affected the burghers came before the Court.

The responsibility for administration

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thus lay primarily with a handful of officials, of whom the Governor and the "Independent Fiscal" were the chief. All hoped for promotion to some more lucrative post in the Company's service. Only in local affairs were the colonists constitutionally consulted. *Heemraden*, partly co-opted and partly nominated, sat with *landdrosts* to administer justice in minor disputes. The courts of *land-drost* and *heemraden* provided a means whereby Government could feel the pulse of the farming community.

The points of contact between a Government which represented the interests of a commercial corporation and the agricultural community at the Cape were insufficient to prevent the emergence of a pronounced cleavage in outlook between official Cape Town and the farming population to the north and east of Table Mountain. At the time of the van der Stel episode, a strong antipathy of interest had appeared which left a heritage of suspicion and hostility. Even after the suppression of official farming, the selfishness of the Company's rule provoked resistance from a section of the burghers and the removal of the more restless

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spirits beyond the effective jurisdiction of the Government. This section was composed exclusively of cattle farmers, men who were desirous of a fuller freedom than could be realized within reach of the Company and its officials at the Cape. The process of dispersion of the colonists over the wide tablelands of the interior and along the coastlands to the north-east had been proceeding steadily since the opening of the eighteenth century. Crossing the Hottentot Hollands mountains, these frontiersmen of South African history left some of their number on the fertile belt, where Swellendam was presently (1745) to become the centre of a new magisterial district. The majority, however, caring little for the settled life of the small free-hold farmer, continued to extend away from the Company's jurisdiction, reaching the Great Fish River about 1778, and establishing in 1786 the village, and presently the magistracy, of Graaff Reinet. Meanwhile, the Orange River had been crossed in 1760, though it was not so named till nineteen years later.

The colony had no fixed northern boundary during the rule of the Company, but, in 1778, moved to action by reports

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of the contact of frontier farmers with the advancing Bantu, Governor van Plettenberg set up a beacon near the present town of Colesberg, to mark its north-eastern limit. Van Plettenberg named the Great Fish River as the boundary, beyond which the frontiersmen should not pass in search of pasture for their cattle.

The Company never succeeded in placing effective restraint upon the restless movements of the frontiersmen. Even in the early years of the eighteenth century, the cattle farmer was fast becoming the *trek-boer*. His sons grew up on the veld, preferring an isolated life and spending a great part of it in their tented trek waggons. Despite the prohibitions of the Company, which wished to limit the size of the colony and to avert the possibility of conflict with the native inhabitants, the trek-boers continued to make their own frontiers, each generation penetrating farther afield into fresh country and becoming more vagrant and unsettled in manner of life. Meagre rainfall and destructive blights militated against agriculture, whilst the ease with which *loan-places* could be taken up was a further inducement to nomadic habits. These

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loan-places were annual leases of 6,000 acre farms, subject (after 1714) to a nominal rent charge. In course of time, after the occupation of a loan-place, the younger sons would resume the outward movement, themselves taking up new farms where water and grazing were to be found. In their wanderings they formed the habits of self-resource and independence, regarding official Cape Town as the seat of an alien and largely hostile government, inasmuch as the Company had done nothing to forward their interests and yet had presumed to tax and to command them. All the admirable qualities of the veld-boer, his intrepidity, warm-hearted hospitality and his signal gifts in the building up of a community beyond the boundaries of civilized life, were developed in the pastoral solitudes of the interior.

Meanwhile, in the settled districts of the south-west, the community was becoming politically self-conscious. In 1779 the tidings from North America encouraged the burghers to send a deputation to Holland to claim representation on the Council of Policy and the right of appeal to Amsterdam, instead of to Batavia. In Holland, as well as in America, there had

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been talk of natural rights and popular liberty. The discontented burghers accordingly styled themselves the "Cape Patriots," and studied the Declaration of American Independence, with a view to formulating the rights of their fellow-colonists. But the Company was not prepared to modify the autocratic nature of its administration. Despite a further deputation (1784), the directors would go no further than the admission of six burghers to seats in the High Court, and the establishment of a committee of three officials and three burghers to advise the Council as to the raising of taxation.

The outbreak of the French Revolution (1789) found the Company ill-prepared for such expenditure as would be necessary to put its eastern possessions in a state of defence. Its spice trade had ceased to bring in profits commensurate with the heavy charges which the Company had incurred for maintenance of its commercial monopoly. It made a final effort in 1792 when it sent out Nederburgh and Frykenius as special commissioners to revive, if that were possible, the sinking fortunes of the Company in the East. At the Cape, expenditure was on an abnor-

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mally large scale, and the commissioners could do little more than recommend a curtailment of outgoings, together with an increase in taxation. They were prepared to allow the farmers to export their surplus grain to Holland or Batavia, but they were insistent on the necessity for employing Dutch ships for this purpose. With the outbreak of war in Europe, however, very few Dutch ships made their appearance in Table Bay. The new paper money began to depreciate in value, whilst discontent accumulated against the auction and transfer dues. In the interior, the cattle farmers, harassed by unsympathetic officials and by Bantu raids, began to take matters into their own hands and to refuse to pay further taxes to a government which was powerless to protect them. Fired with the spirit of the French Revolution, burghers in Graaff Reinet and Swellendam expelled the local magistrates and clamoured for the election of a national assembly. It was the year (1795) of the French invasion of Holland and its conversion into the Batavian Republic under French influence. The British Government had already agreed, if called upon, to defend the United Provinces and its

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oversea possessions against the French, and, under the authority of the Prince of Orange, it now proceeded to despatch a fleet to occupy the Cape. On June 11th, the British warships entered Simon's Bay, and, with little resistance from the authorities, secured possession of Cape Town and its immediate neighbourhood.

CHAPTER III

EARLY BRITISH RULE AT THE CAPE

THE old Colonial Empire of Great Britain, which ended its days in 1783, was based on the mercantilist principle of economic self-sufficiency. The colonies had been originally plantations for the cultivation of raw materials. At a later stage, they were essentially markets for British manufactures. They derived, no doubt, substantial advantages from the imperial connection, but their expansion into communities wealthy in natural resources and fully competent to manufacture for their own needs eventually rendered obsolete the notion of colonial subjection, which lay behind the administrative system of the old Empire.

Nearly four millions of colonists broke away from the British allegiance at the close of the American War. The only colonial possessions that remained to the Empire were the French-speaking colony

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of Canada and a handful of West Indian islands. To these were added, in the period of the great wars (1783–1815), by settlement or peaceful cession, a convict station in New South Wales and various small colonial possessions acquired for purposes of sea power or trade.

The Cape of Good Hope was one of these acquisitions. There was little prospect of commercial gain from the possession of this “frontier fortress” of the East, but Simon’s Bay was regarded as a potentially important naval base. Commercialism was on the wane. Reciprocity, the prelude to thorough-going free trade, had been substituted for the old idea of a trading monopoly. In other respects, also, the new Empire afforded a sharp contrast to the old. In the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, slavery had been regarded as the inevitable outcome of the establishment of plantations in tropical lands. But in 1788 Sierra Leone had been acquired as a home for enfranchised negro slaves, and, within twenty years, the slave trade had been made illegal for British subjects. The new Empire was to be more responsive to the calls of humanitarianism in the vitally important matter of the wel-

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fare of backward races. As regards communities of white colonists, there gradually emerged the notion of the Empire as a family held together by ties of sentiment. The nineteenth century was less practical, and more romantic and imaginative than its predecessors. For a generation, indeed, this more liberal conception of the Empire had to contend against stubbornly held views, which were the legacy of the American Revolution. The lost colonies in North America had been allowed a substantial measure of domestic autonomy. Their repudiation of the sovereignty of the Imperial Parliament was held to demonstrate the danger that self-governing institutions might lead to separation. The outbreak of the French Revolution increased the disinclination of the governing classes to extend political freedom in the new Empire. Nevertheless, the idea of commercial subordination had been successfully challenged. The way was open for adoption of a more liberal policy resting on partnership rather than subjection.

When the British occupied the Cape (1795), the first steps had already been taken to establish a new civilization in Africa based on Christianity and freedom.

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The foundation of Sierra Leone was a measure of the growing activity and enterprise in the colonial sphere of the leaders of the Evangelical Movement. Imbued with a deep faith in humanity, the Evangelicals, notably Wilberforce and Granville Sharp, had begun their campaign against the enslavement and exploitation of backward peoples. Their influence at the Colonial Office soon became the dominant factor in the shaping of Britain's imperial policy. Through James Stephen (1825–47), the humanitarian impulse was effective in ensuring the constant vigilance of the authorities in all parts of the Empire where coloured races were in need of protection.

This new vigilance was naturally accompanied by the maintenance of the legislative supremacy of the Imperial Parliament. In Canada, where there were no slaves to liberate or backward races to safeguard, the bonds of authority were relaxed. The Cape, like most of the tropical dependencies of Great Britain, was regarded as a liability, dependent on financial support from the Mother Country and in need of supervision as regards treatment of the coloured labourer. It

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was considered desirable that the government should be military in character, subject to the ultimate control of the permanent officials at Downing Street. These officials were distrustful of colonial legislatures and inclined to allow very little discretion to colonial governors.

Britain's original occupation of the Cape as trustee for the Prince of Orange terminated with the conclusion of the Peace of Amiens. The British Governors had been conscious of the temporary nature of their responsibilities, and they had avoided the introduction of radical changes. The real break with the traditions of the past occurred under the direct administration of the new Batavian Republic (1803-6), when Janssens and de Mist authorized changes far more radical than had been contemplated by the somewhat aloof and aristocratic representatives of King George III. De Mist was a man of the *Aufklärung*, ready to permit civil marriage and the separation of Church and State. During the brief period of restored Dutch rule, de Mist, with Janssens's assistance, reorganized the machinery of government, providing for the impartial administration of justice by professional judges and the

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introduction of religious toleration. The renewal of war, however, brought with it the rapid termination of Dutch government at the Cape, which passed under British control early in 1806. The colony was ceded to Great Britain by the Treaty of 1814.

Until the year 1825, the Cape was automatically administered by Governors unadvised by either council or legislature. Despite the friction which resulted from the juxtaposition of representatives of an intensely aristocratic society with a democratic community of farmers and traders, the colony made undoubted steps towards prosperity. The attitude of British officials might be rigid and unsympathetic, but their administration involved the removal of obstacles to freedom of trade, a vastly extended market for colonial produce, and governmental improvements which included the institution of judicial circuits. In 1825 an advisory council was established as the first instalment of self-government. The change was not unconnected with the arrival at Algoa Bay in 1820 of a considerable number of British emigrants. The war had been followed by the usual aftermath of poverty

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and unemployment, and, with a view to relieving distress and at the same time strengthening the hold of Great Britain on the Cape, Parliament had voted £50,000 for the transport of 5,000 emigrants of the British working classes to the eastern coastlands of the Colony. In a period when population was, for the first time, pressing seriously upon the means of subsistence, the prospect of the advantages which Britain might derive from colonizing vacant lands overseas was gradually producing a change of attitude towards colonial possessions. To a generation confronted by the momentous and unfamiliar changes of the Industrial Revolution, and deriving cold comfort from economists of the school of Malthus, the colonies, with their unappropriated crown lands, were a new and attractive field for imperial development. The main stream of organized emigration was directed towards the Canadian prairies. The relative poverty of South Africa and the presence of an alarmingly vigorous and uncivilized Bantu population reduced to meagre proportions the quota which made its way to the Cape of Good Hope. Nevertheless, the 1820 settlement, successful after much

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initial hardship, pointed the way to important political developments. Few of the new settlers belonged to the politically self-conscious British middle classes, but among their number were one or two leaders of outstanding ability, with whose assistance the Colony overbore the resistance to reform of the autocratic Lord Charles Somerset, and obtained, in the late 'twenties, a free press and the liberty to assemble in public meeting.

Meanwhile, a social revolution had been foreshadowed by the issue of ordinances designed to bring Hottentots and other coloured people under the protection of the law. The new ordinances were primarily due to the activity of missionaries. The great evangelical missionary societies had been established towards the close of the eighteenth century, and their representatives began to make their appearance at the Cape in 1792. Almost from the first, there emerged a conspicuous divergence of outlook between missionary and colonist. To the Dutch farmer, inequality of the races was a fundamental truth. There were "natural distinctions of race and religion," which could not be maintained if the black man was to be encour-

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aged to claim legal equality with his white master. Liberty of movement was an inducement to "uncontrolled vagabondage," whilst the permission to take his grievances to the white magistrate was a temptation to falsehood and misrepresentation. There was something to be said for this point of view. The Hottentots had only recently emerged from nomadic barbarism, and impartial travellers noticed their constitutional aversion to labour. In the early nineteenth century, the establishment of mission stations for Hottentots and other "free" coloured people may have accentuated the labour shortage by inducing servants to desert their employment. The farmers' demand that pressure should be applied to Hottentots to induce them to enter their service was explicable, in view of the serious difficulties under which agriculture was carried on, subsequent to the prohibition of the slave trade.

These accepted views were sharply challenged by the missionaries. They admitted the backwardness of the Hottentots, but they attributed this to the lack of opportunity to better their position. Hottentots were legally incapacitated from

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holding land, and they were no longer permitted to live a nomadic life, supporting themselves by killing game and digging for roots. Lord Caledon's Proclamation (1809) required that they should have registered places of abode, and that they should be restrained from moving about the country without a pass. The operation of this law placed the Hottentot very much at the mercy of the local *landdrosts* and field cornets. If unemployed, he was liable to conviction for vagrancy, so that the general effect of this regulation was to compel him to choose between the mission station and service with the farmer.

Successive Governors did something to improve the condition of the Hottentots. Lord Caledon, with all his concern to check vagrancy and to encourage Hottentots to enter service, was nevertheless moved to order *landdrosts* to investigate cases of cruelty to them. In 1811 such cases were to be prosecuted before the new circuit courts. The so-called "Black Circuit" of 1812 witnessed the first bitter conflict between colonial opinion and missionary influence. Accusations of gross ill-use had been preferred against farmers by James Read, colleague of the eccentric

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missionary, van der Kemp. Unfortunately, Read and his friends did not trouble to sift genuine cases of maltreatment from a host of exaggerated, and for the most part baseless, charges. There were eight convictions for criminal violence to coloured servants, and several more for illegal detention of Hottentot children as "apprentices." The abuses needing correction were sufficiently great to justify examination by an impartial tribunal. But Read allowed zeal and credulity to get the better of his judgment and the immoderation of his accusations against respectable colonists roused strong resentment. In the succeeding period, there was a not unnatural tendency to retaliate with indiscriminate charges levelled at the work of Christian missions in the Colony. The bitterest accusations were laid against the stations of the London Missionary Society, to which Read and van der Kemp belonged ; and it was to investigate these unfavourable reports that Dr. John Philip landed at Cape Town (February 1819), becoming next year superintendent of all the Society's stations in South Africa.

Philip was a man of fearless disposition, disputatious and opinionated, but with

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genuine capacity for administration and unbounded energy. It was inevitable that he should meet with strong opposition to his policy, but it was largely his own fault that opposition degenerated into personal criticism and hostility. With no doubts as to the righteousness of his cause, he was himself unsparing in condemnation both of lukewarm adherents and of downright opponents. His supreme lack of tact and his total inability to appreciate the point of view of critics must not, however, be allowed to obscure the sanity and real breadth of vision which distinguishes Philip's outlook on South African problems. His suggestions for the solution of the Hottentot problem were the only constructive proposals advanced during his long sojourn in the Colony. He went to the root of the matter when he declared that the coloured man could not attain to a civilization of his own unless he were allowed to occupy land and to enjoy the full protection of the law.

His policy was one of segregation, at least for the generation or two which would, in his optimistic judgment, suffice to raise the coloured man to a level of substantial equality with the European

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colonist. Hence Philip's strong denunciation of the policy which he found in favour with the authorities, that of dispersion of the Hottentots and other coloured people among the farmers. The landless Hottentot, he declared, was at the mercy of the local *landdrost* and field cornet, unless he cared to enter a mission station. Even this opportunity might be denied him, for the stations were unpopular as affording a refuge for idle vagrants and runaway servants, and Philip failed to induce the Government to make a substantial increase in the grant for their support.

His most notable success was the abrogation in 1828 of the laws which discriminated against Hottentots on the ground of colour. The so-called Fiftieth Ordinance released Hottentots from the obligation to carry passes and declared them competent to purchase and possess land. Other clauses strictly controlled the practice of apprenticing Hottentot children, and limited the availability of written contracts of service to twelve months. The ordinance was the outcome of persistent representation of the claims of the coloured people by Philip and his friends,

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both at the Cape and in the United Kingdom, through the influence of Exeter Hall. With the farming community at the Cape, Dutch and English, it was unpopular, since it was regarded as renewing the evils of vagrancy. For this complaint there was probably some justification. The emancipation of the Hottentots had been accompanied by no constructive measures for their employment or support. Apart from the establishment of the Kat River settlement in 1829, no fresh grants of land were made, so that many Hottentots were obliged to resort to such practices as squatting. The ordinance probably went too far in emphasizing the liberties of coloured servants, without sufficiently defining their obligations. A later ordinance (1842) accordingly provided penalties for deserting employment and for insubordination, placing, however, the Hottentots and other coloured folk on a footing of legal equality with the European, inasmuch as the same law now governed the relations of masters and servants, irrespective of race or colour.

With the movement for the emancipation of the slaves the missionaries were less directly concerned. Before Dr. Philip

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landed in Table Bay, significant steps had been taken to improve the lot of the Cape slaves. The importation of slaves had been rendered illegal by the imperial statute of 1807. Some clandestine landings of slaves from foreign vessels engaged in the slave trade occurred during the years 1808 to 1810, but this was soon checked. At the same time, the enhanced value of slave property, which naturally followed from the prohibition of further importation, effected a marked improvement in their treatment. The West Indian form of plantation slavery had never been introduced at the Cape. By far the greater number of the seventeen thousand slaves which the settlement contained at the close of the Company's rule (1795), were domestic servants and artisans. From an early date, Indians and Malays, sent to the Cape for political offences, had taken up tailoring and furniture-making, and begun to compete with Europeans in other skilled trades. Mozambique slaves furnished the class of unskilled workmen in the town, whilst household servants were, in the main, half-castes, born in the country and reared for domestic duties. There can be little doubt that slavery in

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Cape Town and its immediate neighbourhood was largely nominal. It was customary to provide slaves with fresh meat and fish in abundance, and to clothe them well. Though incapable of acquiring property without their owners' consent, the better class of skilled slaves were usually allowed to reside where they wished, and to dispose, under certain conditions, of their own labour. Slaves might be subjected to corporal punishment for walking in the streets with a lighted pipe, or brawling in the churchyard, but they were maintained in tolerable comfort in their old age, and were occasionally emancipated by their masters for faithful service. In the agricultural areas of the west, they formed the indispensable supply of labour for the cultivation of grain and of the vine. Hottentots, however, were largely used as herdsmen by the cattle farmers of the frontier districts, among whom slaves were relatively few. Severity of treatment was far commoner in the outlying areas, as might have been expected. For it was customary for farmers to retain the more intelligent and mild-mannered servants in the settled west, whilst disposing of slaves of desperate and ungovernable temper to

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the frontier proprietor. In Graaff Reinet and Swellendam, slave risings accompanied by violence were not infrequent, and the safety of the farmer's family seemed to depend upon severity of punishment for insubordination. Malay slaves earned for themselves a bad reputation for treachery and disobedience, and it was not unnatural that farmers should occasionally retaliate by brutal flogging of recalcitrant servants. Nevertheless, even in the country districts, slavery was far milder than in the West Indian Colonies, to which the attention of humanitarian reformers was in the main directed. Lichtenstein, travelling in the train of Commissary de Mist (1803-5), was impressed by the ease and contentment of Cape slaves, rather than their misfortunes ; and he was careful to record the considerate attention bestowed by many masters on the maintenance and comfort of aged slaves.

Mild treatment, together with the salubrity of the climate, caused a fairly rapid increase in the numbers of the slave population. This increase was a source of misgiving in many quarters. At the Cape, Lord Charles Somerset, anxious lest Hot-

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tentot apprentices and other free coloured servants should be confused with slaves, hastened to establish (1816) a system of registration. Henceforth, there was to be an official record of all slave property, and no infant subsequently born was to be recognized as a slave, unless registered within six months of its birth. Somerset also established a school for the children of government slaves. In 1823, impressed with the growing strength of the anti-slavery movement in England, he sent home a plan for the enfranchisement by state purchase of every slave child born in the Colony. The British Government had already prohibited the employment of predial slaves on the new holdings of the Albany settlers, but its attention was now directed to the West Indies, and Somerset's suggestion received little notice. Orders were, however, addressed to him to effect an improvement in the status and treatment of slaves. Somerset promptly issued a proclamation (March 1823) prohibiting compulsory labour on Sundays, and permitting slaves to own property and to contract valid marriages. Though he was criticized for not having submitted the proposed changes for the approval of

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the imperial authorities, Somerset had made it easier for slaves to accumulate capital, which they could use, after 1826, to purchase their manumission even from an unwilling master.

The right to enforce manumission at a price determined by impartial valuators was accompanied by the provision that slave guardians were to make it their duty to see that the new regulations were observed. Moreover, conviction for gross illtreatment was now to involve forfeiture of property in the slave. These regulations formed part of the so-called Nineteenth Ordinance, and were based on the Trinidad Order-in-Council of 1824. In view, however, of Somerset's emphatic statement that the practice of driving slaves to work with a whip was totally unknown at the Cape, the British Government agreed to the omission of the clauses which prohibited the carrying of whips in the field and enforced the keeping of a punishment record book—a concession which was withdrawn four years later. The new regulations were stigmatized as degrading by Cape slave-owners, and were largely unenforceable in the country districts. In some parts, slaves committed

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acts of violence under the impression that slavery was being prolonged by masters contrary to the intentions of Government. The widespread belief that emancipation was coming increased the insubordination of slaves and added to the difficulties of western farmers who had learnt to depend entirely on slave cultivation. Despite the feeling that it would be unwise to go further in the direction of alteration of the slave laws, the officials at the Cape were helpless to avert the imposition of further restraints (1830-2), which were framed to suit the very different conditions of slavery in the West Indies.

The attempt to mitigate slavery by regulations imperfectly adapted to local conditions was ill-advised. The machinery of local government was too weak to admit of enforcement of the law, and the natural resentment of the Cape farmer found expression in the withdrawal of indulgences formerly extended to slaves. When public opinion was not agreed as to the advisability of taking away the master's right of domestic correction, it was perhaps inevitable that juries should refuse to convict even in the face of evidence of downright brutality. On the

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other hand, the owners did little to prepare for the inevitable approach of emancipation. Graaff Reinet proprietors proposed that female children should be enfranchised at birth, conditionally upon the removal of the existing restrictions upon masters, but such a prolongation of servitude, under conditions which would have made effective control impossible, was unthinkable. At Cape Town, a few philanthropically-inclined persons, aided by subscriptions from overseas, maintained a Cape of Good Hope Philanthropic Society which emancipated 102 children in four years. But the births of slave children continued to be greatly in excess of deaths and manumissions combined, and it is difficult to resist the conclusion that slavery could only have been terminated by act of the Imperial Parliament. The decline of the West Indian interest and the coming into power of the Whigs, on the wave of popular enthusiasm for reform, made it possible to make slave enfranchisement a government measure. Though Wilberforce died within a few days of the second reading of the Bill, victory was now certain, and in 1834 the Act came into force throughout the British dominions.

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The measure was far from realizing the hopes of the radical emancipationists. It accepted the principle of compensation for owners, and it provided for a period of apprenticeship, during which enfranchised slaves were to work for their masters under conditions adjusted by colonial legislatures. Resentment only developed at a later date, when it became known that no more than one and a quarter million pounds would be available as compensation for Cape proprietors, though the value of slave property had been estimated at more than twice this amount. Yet the loss of capital was in many cases less serious than the acute labour difficulties to which the Act contributed. Many of the freed slaves could not be induced to work, at the conclusion (1838) of the period of apprenticeship, whilst the previous removal of restrictions on vagrancy made it more difficult to find a satisfactory alternative in the labour of the free coloured man. Nevertheless, the ill effects of the Act of Emancipation have probably been exaggerated. Economic pressure compelled most of the new apprentices to continue to work for their living, and wages only slowly rose above the level of

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the previous cost of their subsistence. The transition to free labour meant an ultimate advantage in higher values all round, whilst the circulation of compensation money enabled many to purchase woolled sheep or to take up farms recently deserted by emigrant farmers from the eastern districts. Moreover, the British taxpayer had been called upon to act with conspicuous generosity, whilst Parliament could not fairly be blamed for maldistribution of the money voted. Slave property had been declared to be immoral, and there was much to be said for the view that colonies which had clamoured for the introduction of slaves should share the burden of emancipation.

The Act was a contributory factor in promoting wholesale migration from the Cape. There was little beyond the magnitude of the numbers involved to distinguish the so-called *Great Trek* from earlier phases in the movement of eastward expansion. The pioneering spirit was in-born in the frontiersmen of the Colony. Disliking all forms of governmental restraint, these men had for generations preferred the nomadic life of the cattle farmer and the hunter to the comforts

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and security which civilization could only give at the price of acceptance of the obligations of citizenship. Trekking was a commonplace of their everyday life. Huts hastily constructed of mud and reeds represented the homesteads of all but a few of the frontier farmers. Long expeditions were constantly being organized beyond the colonial frontiers for the discovery of fresh pasture-land. This process of expansion was more or less continuous from the early years of the eighteenth century. The barrier which the Bantu presented to further expansion in the coastal area did no more than divert the main stream in a northerly direction. In the first years of British rule, the increasing scarcity of grazing-land compelled the cattle farmer to look further afield and to contemplate migration on a large scale. The period of random trekking of the younger men gave place, about the year 1830, to an organized movement of farmers, driven partly by economic necessity and partly by political discontent to seek new homes in the interior of southern Africa.

The new policy of legal equality for the coloured man, coupled with emancipation

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of the slaves, injured the frontiersman both in his pride of race and in his economic interests. The poverty and infertility of the greater part of the Colony made farming unremunerative, except on the basis of cheap labour. The missionary had taught the coloured man the advantages of independence and insisted on the abrogation of the vagrancy laws. Slaves had never been numerous in the eastern districts, but the difficulty of procuring alternative labour made emancipation a hardship there scarcely less than in the settled west. Indignant farmers, in their indictment of British policy, accordingly laid principal emphasis on the "mischievous" activities of the missionaries, and on the harmful legislation, which seemed likely to make labour both dear and unsatisfactory throughout the Colony.

Nevertheless, it is improbable that the more substantial men, who abandoned settled farms rather than remain within the jurisdiction of the British Government, would have joined the Trek, had it not been for the absence of security in the frontier lands. It was impossible for the Government to organize defence on such

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a scale as would have safeguarded the farmers from losses of stock. It was not that the Bantu were naturally of a thieving disposition. But they were incapable of understanding European notions of exclusive land-ownership, and the lifting of colonial cattle was intended as retaliation for dispossession of their hunting-grounds. Like the European farmers, they were wasteful agriculturalists and the clash in the frontier area is attributable at root to the shortage of pastoral land.

In 1835, for reasons which will be considered in the next chapter, the British Government had ordered withdrawal from territory to the east of the Keiskama River, and had decided to send out a man, whom the farmers distrusted, to negotiate treaties with the Xosa chiefs: The treaties were intended to supersede the system of reprisals for cattle thefts which was believed to have occasioned the hostilities on the frontier.

The new system inspired no confidence among the frontier colonists. So early as 1834, advance parties of men who despaired of comfort and security in the frontier lands had begun to investigate the capabilities of the country to the far

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north-east of the Colony. The abandonment of the territory recently conquered from the tribesmen contributed to swell the stream of emigration. English and Dutch farmers alike had suffered injury from Xosa raids, whilst their self-esteem had been deeply wounded by the suggestion that justice was on the side of the raiders. They could not be expected to appreciate the point of view of a tribal community accustomed to common enjoyment of the land, and they were unaware of the culpable delay of the Cape Governor in supplying authentic information to Downing Street. The decision to give back conquered territory to savage tribesmen seemed to them to be in harmony with the whole tenor of British policy at the Cape, which had been to insist on equality before the law, irrespective of colour or standard of civilization. They attributed the concern of the authorities for the rights of the black man to the prompting of the missionaries, and they preferred to brave the dangers of a journey into the unknown interior, rather than remain under the jurisdiction of a Government which ignored the "fundamental distinctions of race and colour."

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The first parties of Voortrekkers left the Colony in 1835, encountering incredible hardships in their progress northward. The main party crossed the Orange River a year later, entering a land devastated and largely depopulated by the ravages of the warlike Chaka. Many joined the movement at the last minute, fearing isolation if they remained amidst deserted farms; others followed, when victories over Matabele and Zulu reassured them as to the prospects of settlement in a land infested with savages and wild animals. In all, some ten thousand men, women and children took part in the emigration between the years 1834 and 1840. Incredible patience and bravery were manifested in the course of the hazardous journey into the vast interior. Nor were powers of organization lacking. Many of the leaders, notably the far-sighted Piet Retief, had been field cornets in the frontier districts. These men insisted on a measure of governmental organization to guard against dissensions, and keep the various parties in close association. In the long run, this proved to be impracticable. The immense area of grassland stretching from the Kalahari to the moun-

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tains of Basutoland and bounded on the north by the Limpopo, held out alluring prospects of land in abundance and encouraged those who did not fear isolation to spread out over the wide plateau. Whilst some ventured into the fever-infested north, others under Maritz and Potgieter (with whom rode Paul Kruger as a boy of eleven) chastised the Matabele, and obtained the cession of the territory lying between the Vet and Vaal Rivers, where they presently founded the first trekker village of Winburg. For some months Retief's abilities enabled him to hold the community together in obedience to himself, as elected "Governor," advised by a council of policy. But Potgieter could not be restrained from further trekking. Driving the Matabele across the Limpopo, he secured possession of the country to the north of the Vaal River, as far as the Zoutpansberg, and established himself at Potchefstroom. Retief, on the other hand, preferred to make his way through the passes of the Drakensberg and down into fertile Natal. There, a strip of the coastlands on either side of the Bluff, which da Gama had sighted in 1497, had been in the occupation of

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Englishmen for thirteen years before Retief's arrival. But the British Government had refused to recognize the infant settlement, and Retief may have hoped to secure the port, which the Englishmen had named D'Urban, for his own followers. He was well aware of the advantages of some point of contact with the outside world, and he did not share the distrust of the authorities at the Cape, which had moved Potgieter to trek as far away from British influence as geography and the strength of Bantu resistance permitted.

Whilst Retief rode ahead with a few followers to establish contact with Dingaan and the English traders at the port, the main body of emigrants moved at a more leisurely pace towards the fertile coastlands. At the Bushman's Rand (on the site of the present city of Pietermaritzburg) they halted to form a palisaded camp against prowling leopards. Retief went to his death at Dingaan's kraal whilst Zulu warriors broke through the laager at Weenen. Reinforcements from the high veld failed to stem the tide of Zulu success and Dingaan's impis occupied D'Urban. The news brought the

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ablest surviving Voortrekker, A. W. J. Pretorius, in haste from the west, whilst British troops disembarked at the port. The soldiers were sent, not to annex the country, but to keep order and avert further fighting between Dutch and Zulu. But there was no hope of restraining Pretorius so long as Dingaan went unpunished for his treachery. At the battle of the Blood River (December 16, 1838), the courage and discipline of the farmers overthrew the hitherto irresistible impis, and prepared the way for the foundation of a trekker republic in the territory which was theirs by right of conquest. The presence of the soldiers at the port was an inducement to the trekkers to hasten their effective occupation of the district. Streets were accordingly laid out, and *erven* distributed, in what was to be the capital city of Pietermaritzburg, so named in memory of the exploits of Retief and Maritz. Outside the town, farms were allotted on a liberal scale. Villages were planned at Weenen and Congella, and *landdrosts* appointed to administer justice. Beyond the villages, field cornets exercised the duties to which all had been accustomed in the Colony.

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By the year 1840, a volksraad had begun to function at Pietermaritzburg, twenty-four burghers elected annually by manhood suffrage meeting at irregular intervals when business was pressing. Across the Tugela, Panda, who had overthrown Dingaan, was suffered to become the vassal of the new Republic. It was the first emergence in South Africa of an organized political community which repudiated allegiance to Cape Town.

The new state was destined to be short-lived. From the first, Sir George Napier had urged the Imperial Government to withhold recognition of an independent state on the coast of South Africa. He now claimed that nothing short of annexation would avert the prospect of serious conflict between the trekkers and native tribes. The colonial authorities had been powerless to prevent emigration, and, though they might claim the trekkers as British subjects, they could not force them to return to the Colony. Napier could point to disputes with the Pondo chief, Faku, as threatening the tranquillity of the entire coastal region to the north-east of the Colony. Moreover, the Volksraad had debated a scheme for the

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wholesale removal, south of the Umtamvuma River, of the "surplus" native population of Natal. Approval was accordingly given for the despatch of further troops, and in 1843 Natal was declared a British possession. This decision was dictated solely by the desire to safeguard the native inhabitants of Natal and Zululand from possible oppression. The Imperial Government, despite its aversion from further territorial expansion of the Empire, accepted annexation as the sole means of keeping the peace between emigrants and natives.

The declaration of British sovereignty over Natal left the Voortrekkers in possession of two main areas of settlement, nucleated respectively round Winburg and Potchefstroom. The extinction of the Republic left them without even the loose federal bond, which the nominal supremacy of the Pietermaritzburg Volksraad had provided. Henceforth, the resolute individualism of the rival leaders was allowed full scope. The dispersion of so small a community over the immense area lying between the Orange River and the Zoutpansberg made organization virtually an impossibility. Beyond the Vaal,

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affairs remained for many years in a state of chaos, with four or more detached units claiming to be independent republics. Not until 1860 was a *grondwet*, or constitution, accepted over the greater part of the trans-Vaal area. Farther south, the farmers grouped round Winburg maintained a precarious independence, harassed by Basuto raids, until 1848, when the Cape Governor, Sir Harry Smith, declared the land British territory.

Sir Harry Smith was an ambitious and impulsive statesman, but the declaration of British sovereignty was not the ill-considered action of a man prone to hasty decisions. Great Britain was inevitably involved in the fortunes of the emigrants. The Trek had seriously complicated the problems of native policy. The spreading out of the thin European population of the Colony over half southern Africa threatened to undermine the effectiveness, if not the security, of the white man. The destruction of political unity involved the possibility of discordant policies in dealing with native tribes. The Home Government could not view with equanimity the aggravation of the old frontier problems, and the extension of the area

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of conflict and insecurity. To control the trekkers it made tentative agreements with native chiefs, who were to make themselves responsible for order within their territories, and hand over European malefactors for trial in colonial courts. But the chiefs could guarantee no stable control, and the assumption of direct responsibility was the only way out of an *impasse*. Notwithstanding the precedent of 1843, when the Natal Volksraad had submitted without resistance, many of the farmers took up arms in defence of their independence. Pretorius, hastening from Potchefstroom, was routed at Boomplaats, and a British Resident, supported by a handful of regulars, installed at Bloemfontein.

The Orange River Sovereignty lasted but six years. The Imperial Government expected the territory to be self-supporting, despite its slender economic resources and the poverty of its small population of farmers. The Resident, since he could dispose of no strong military force, had no effective authority over the natives, and trouble with the Basuto chief, Moshesh, culminated in a small disaster. At once confusion reigned. The Home Govern-

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ment began to believe that annexation had been a mistake. Parliament became increasingly hostile to expenditure on a far-away colony where native wars followed one another with ominous frequency. There were signs that imperial policy had begun to swing away from humanitarianism, which had supported expansion for the protection of backward races, in favour of retrenchment and the avoidance of further responsibility. The Sand River Convention (1852) recognized the independence of the trans-Vaal farmers and thus established a not unwelcome barrier against further territorial expansion. The British representatives readily promised not to make treaties with native tribes north of the Vaal, and renounced all concern for the welfare of the coloured inhabitants of the new Republic. Now that the neutrality of the northern republicans had been assured, there was a fairer prospect of securing the tranquillity of the Sovereignty. But Moshesh continued to harass the farmers, and it became evident that coercion would be exceedingly costly. Moreover, the Dutch section of the colonial population had never ceased to denounce the retention of unwilling

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subjects beyond the Orange River. Early in 1854, Britain became involved in the Crimean War. Her Government felt that the Mother Country could no longer afford to be drawn into ceaseless wars in South Africa, and that the trekkers might now be safely left to their own devices. It was recognized that the advance of Dutch settlement over the plateaux of the interior was conducive to the spread of civilization, whilst the existence of a strong trekker community would be a bulwark for the British territories to the south. So long as Britain retained possession of the coast, it could control communications with the world outside. These arguments were sufficiently impressive to overbear the protests of Exeter Hall. On February 17, 1854, Sir George Clerk signed the Bloemfontein Convention, which transferred the government of the Sovereignty to a provisional administration pending the election of a president and volksraad. The independence of the new state was guaranteed on terms very similar to those which had been concluded with the Transvaal. Despite the equivocal attitude of Clerk, the withdrawal was accomplished without bitterness. In the new Volks-

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raad, English and Dutch sat together in harmonious co-operation, and elaborated a constitution compounded of British and American precedents.

In the process of state-building, the influence of frontier conditions was strong. Both Republics were very largely pastoral, and dependent for their external connections on the neighbouring British Colonies. Their burghers had toiled manfully to establish for themselves new homes in a strange land, and the struggle had intensified their individualism and love of personal liberty. Their inexperience of political responsibility disposed them to depreciate the need for unified control. The farmers of the Orange Free State early achieved a civil executive, headed by a President, elected for five years by universal suffrage, but north of the Vaal commandants-general contended with one another for supremacy. Society was largely patriarchal, and though volksraads might be established, the individual citizen was expected to deliver his personal judgment on all proposed laws. The inherited suspicion of governmental authority born in the frontier lands of the Cape, found expression in the deliberate limitation of

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the legislative powers of the central assemblies. In the Free State, the Volksraad might not interfere with the rights of burghers to assemble in public meeting, whilst liberty of conscience and the freedom of the press were guaranteed in the *grondwet*. Their Transvaal neighbours, before delegating the function of law-making to their elected representatives, took care to safeguard their cherished ideals, notably that of inequality in Church and State between black and white. Under Jan Brand (1864-88), the constitution of the Free State began to function efficiently, but the Transvaal had no effective government, central or local, prior to 1870.

Meanwhile, democratic institutions had been developed at the Cape. The charter of 1827 provided the Colony with an independent judiciary—the indispensable preliminary to a free press. In local government, *landdrosts* and *heemraden* were called upon to surrender their judicial and administrative functions to resident magistrates and civil commissioners, a change which led to a marked improvement in the administration of justice, though it involved the abolition of an

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institution which had taken root in the affections of the older population. In the 'thirties, controversies as to the treatment of the coloured man retarded constitutional development by accentuating the divisions of colonial society. The Cape could not hope to attain to a parliamentary constitution whilst bitter controversy held apart sections of the community, which had been in cordial alliance to resist the autocracy of Lord Charles Somerset. The problems of Hottentot service and slave emancipation were the dominating factors in disclosing the latent divisions among the European population, and so prolonging the need for paternal government. Ministers would go no farther than the establishment of a legislative council, containing a small number of unofficial members. So long as slavery existed, they were obstinately opposed to the introduction of representative institutions, for West Indian assemblies had been foremost in opposing measures for the amelioration of the slave population. Even after emancipation, British ministers were inclined to doubt the expediency of representative government in a colony where a small and scattered European popula-

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tion was divided into Dutch and British. In the 'forties, however, the Liberal administration of Lord John Russell began to relax its minute supervision over the affairs of the colonies. The removal of mercantilist restraints, in favour of a thorough-going policy of free trade, made it easier to allow the colonies to manage their own affairs. The Home Government accordingly acquiesced in the concession of responsible control to Canada, and gave representative institutions (1846) to distant New Zealand. In the same year, Earl Grey invited Sir Henry Pottinger to report on the desirability of introducing an elective legislature at the Cape. Had the colonial community sufficient foresight and political capacity to manage its own affairs ? Within a few years any doubts as to the existence of a well-informed public opinion at the Cape were set at rest. Orders reached Sir Harry Smith to prepare for the reception of convicts. The united stand of Dutch and British against the proposal to establish a convict station in South Africa indicated that parties, which had been bitterly divided on the question of Hottentot and slave rights, now stood together to resist

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a proposal “at variance with the just and inalienable rights of British subjects and perilous to the honour, safety and happiness of the country.”

Meanwhile, the economic prosperity of the Colony had become established. Following the acclimatization of merino sheep, wool jumped to premier position among colonial exports. Moreover, the Great Trek had opened up trade with the interior. Rising revenue made it possible to finance harbour improvements at Table Bay and Port Elizabeth, whilst banks and joint-stock companies multiplied. Economic self-sufficiency was a most powerful argument in favour of self-government. Drafts of a new constitution had been discussed at Cape Town since 1846, and at length in 1853 an order-in-council gave South Africa its first parliamentary assembly.

The new constitution carried to its logical conclusion the principle of equality as between black and white. Male persons, irrespective of colour, received the franchise, if they could show a comparatively low salary, or occupancy, qualification. The erection of an elective upper chamber, for which the franchise was to

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be the same as for the larger house, was a liberal innovation, due to experience of the inefficiency and unpopularity of nominated chambers in many parts of the Empire. The reservation of a civil list, however, removed the executive from the control of the legislature. Though the Imperial Government was prepared to take any risk involved in entrusting the power of legislation to the Dutch-speaking majority, it insisted on retaining control, through the Governor, of the executive officials. In Canada, this system of representative government without parliamentary control had produced discontent and ultimately rebellion. At the Cape, racial cleavage was less pronounced, whilst the appointment (1854) as Governor of a man of unusual ability and experience, in Sir George Grey, ensured that the new constitution would come into operation under the most auspicious circumstances. Two years later, a royal charter was issued which made Natal a Crown Colony.

CHAPTER IV

THE BANTU PROBLEM

THE most baffling political and social problems of southern Africa are those which result from the contact between primitive native culture and European civilization. In many parts of the world the dominant issue has come to be the creation of conditions, under which peoples of different colour and civilization may jointly develop the resources of the land. But small guidance can be derived from the experience of other continents. The coming of the white man to North America and Australia involved the rapid decline, and in some cases the extermination, of the earlier coloured inhabitants. On the other hand, the coloured races have at least held their own in India and the Far East, where climatic conditions have not been favourable to the white man. In South Africa, the race conflict has reached a head, through the impact of East and

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West in a land suitable for European settlement. Nowhere has the white man met the black under quite the same circumstances as those which prevail south of the Limpopo River. The diversity in race, language and standard of civilization among its peoples has produced political, economic and social problems of peculiar intensity.

The colour problem of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries concerned the treatment of Hottentots and slaves. The Bantu were outside the colonial frontiers,—an embarrassment to those entrusted with the military defence of the border lands, but in no sense a problem of domestic policy. Their migration from east-Central Africa, and gradual penetration of the south-east coastal lands, has been referred to in an earlier chapter. Displacing the Bushmen and absorbing the Hottentots, the Bantu established their effective occupation of the coastal regions as far south as the Kei by the middle of the eighteenth century.

It was many years before the local representatives of the Dutch East India Company took any official notice of the presence of the Bantu as their immediate

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neighbours. Contact between Cape cattle-traders and an advance party of Ama-Xosa had produced a skirmish so early as the time of Willem Adriaan van der Stel. But the Company had consistently opposed colonial expansion. Regardless of the fact that it was its own policy of commercial monopoly which drove the cattle farmers ever farther east in search of freedom from the Company's irksome restraints, the local Government endeavoured, by all means in its power, to prevent or control the inevitable trekking. Proclamations, however, were powerless to limit colonial expansion, and the frontier was perforce moved from the Hottentots Holland Mountains to the Gamtoos River, and finally, in 1774, pushed forward to the Fish River. Financial stringency prohibited the maintenance of a military or police force for its protection. In the last years of the Company's rule, its officials did what they could to avert frontier conflicts by forbidding the farmers to cross the Fish River and enter the fertile land, which Governor van Plettenberg had recognized (1778) as Bantu territory. But cattle-trading expeditions to Kafirland were too profitable to be lightly abandoned at

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the behest of a Government, which could not give its subjects adequate protection, even within colonial territory. Conflict on a fairly large scale could not long be averted between two vigorous and migratory peoples, separated by an ill-defined line of frontier, which the Company made no attempt to police or fortify. The first armed clash occurred in 1779, the prelude to a long series of frontier conflicts to determine the possession of land, which both peoples needed for successful prosecution of a wasteful system of farming.

At an earlier stage in the history of the Cape settlement, Bantu resistance might have operated to keep the Colony small, compact and unified. In the days of van Riebeeck, the unexpected strength of Hottentot opposition had led the Council to contemplate a canal across the Cape Flats, to protect its occupation of the peninsula. In the late eighteenth century, contact with the Bantu merely brought about a partial diversion of colonial expansion from the coastal regions, towards the kloofs which lay to the immediate south of the great inland plateau. Soon the more intrepid spirits among the trekkers began to penetrate to

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the grasslands of the high veld and the region of the Orange River, which became the northern boundary of the Colony in 1826. Not until the second generation of the nineteenth century did expansion in this direction also encounter formidable resistance from the Basuto and Bechuana branches of the Bantu race. By this time, the trek-boer had fully developed those habits of nomadic life and impatience of governmental restraint, which have moulded his entire outlook on problems of native policy.

The struggle for possession of the *Zuurveld* to the immediate west of the Fish River continued, despite the Company's vain insistence on non-intercourse between the two races. Its officials could do little to protect the colonists, beyond supplying them with ammunition. At Graaff Reinet, the *landdrost* spoke indiscreetly of the principles of equality and fraternity. The failure of the Company to support and protect its subjects in the outlying areas provoked the insurrectionary movements, which coincided with the first British occupation of the Cape.

The British Government took over with manifest reluctance the responsibility for

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discovering and maintaining some *modus vivendi* on the frontier. Direct government of the Bantu was not contemplated for many years. No responsibility was accepted for the civilization of the coastal tribes. The dominant object of native policy was to protect the colonial frontier from the raids of the black man.

The seeds of misunderstanding were present in the conflict of ideas between Bantu conceptions of land-ownership and European practice. The Bantu knew only a communal tenure. The chief was no more than the trustee of the tribal ground. He could make a grant of usufructory rights to an individual who had brought a piece of waste land under cultivation, but he could not alienate any part of the tribe's holding. The notion of private, or exclusive, ownership of land was alien to Bantu conceptions. No Bantu chief, when he gave his assent to a boundary treaty with the white man, considered that he was ceding territory. Recognition of a new frontier involved only the concession of the right to share with the tribe in the enjoyment of the land. Moreover, the boundaries of the tribal territory were seldom defined with precision. Tillage was

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extremely backward, and tribes moved on from one district to another as the fertility of the soil became exhausted. Until the Ama-Xosa found their further progress barred by the presence of the European cattle farmers, land had been plentiful. The more fertile pastures were naturally occupied first, and between the ground actually occupied by adjacent tribes, there might stretch several hundred acres of inferior land. The European farmer was apt to regard such land as unoccupied country, which he could convert to his own exclusive use. But from the point of view of the Bantu, this was manifest encroachment upon tribal ground.

The frontier problem was thus essentially a problem of the land. Bantu cattle-raiding was intended as retaliation for dispossession of the tribes from their rightful holdings. The continued expansion of colonial settlement in an easterly direction forced back the Ama-Xosa on the tribes pressing forward in their rear. The inevitable result was a state of more or less incessant war. For many years, the Government had no other policy than that of prohibited migration from one side of the colonial border to the other. In 1819,

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however, Lord Charles Somerset adopted the plan of a neutral belt between the Colony and independent Kaffraria, to be patrolled by colonial police, and kept clear of settlement, both European and Bantu. The agreement was made by verbal treaty with a single chief, regardless of the fact that Bantu custom did not recognize the right of any chief to surrender the communal lands. Moreover, the system of prohibiting intercourse was bound to break down as points of contact developed between the two peoples. Growing trade led to the institution of passes to enable the tribesmen to enter the Colony on the occasions of the holding of fairs at Grahamstown and Fort Willshire. At the same time, the demand for cheap labour brought more and more natives across the frontier to enter the service of European farmers. Visitors to Kaffraria were mostly cattle-dealers, but in the 'twenties the missionary societies received permission to establish stations on the Bantu side of the colonial frontier. The succeeding decade was a period of growing interdependence of European and Bantu.

Nevertheless, unsettlement was inevitable, so long as the frontier problem was

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viewed from a purely military angle. The neutral belt was not long left unoccupied, and presently it was referred to as the "ceded territory." Neither police patrols nor commandos could keep the frontier districts secure. The confiscation of Bantu land merely transferred the struggle from one line of frontier to another. Unrest culminated in a general movement of Bantu invasion (December 1834). The tribesmen were able to inflict the heaviest losses on individual farmers, but they were no match for disciplined soldiery. Within six months, the attack had been beaten back. It fell to Governor D'Urban and his military advisers to dictate a settlement. In May 1835, the Governor announced his intention to expel the offending tribes and to annex their territory, as the Province of Queen Adelaide. It was the culmination of the policy of military control. There was no suggestion of civil government for the defeated tribes. D'Urban was merely applying the time-honoured specific of expropriation of native land. Fortunately, expulsion proved to be impracticable. In September, the Governor was obliged to change his mind, and to agree that the Bantu should

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remain in the new Province as subjects of the Queen. The new policy was much more hopeful, for it involved the extension of civilized control over the Bantu to the west of the Kei River.

But, in 1835, the Imperial Government was not prepared to abandon its settled policy of avoiding the assumption of direct control over backward races. It was still less inclined to condone any measures of retaliation. The Governor's despatch, announcing his earlier policy of expulsion, was received coldly at Downing Street. The Colonial Secretary, Lord Glenelg, believed that annexation was inconsistent with justice to the tribes. His detailed reply of December 26, 1835, contained an implied censure of the attitude of the Cape authorities. For this censure, there was some justification. The Governor had failed to inform Glenelg of his change of policy. For many months, he continued unaccountably to ignore the Colonial Secretary's request for further information. D'Urban, not Glenelg, who acted fairly on the information before him, was responsible for the misunderstanding which led to the reversal of the annexation. The refusal to sanction the inclusion of the

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tribes as British subjects within the colonial boundary was unfortunate, for it postponed the commencement of European administration among the Bantu, and helped to swell the Great Trek. For many farmers now despaired of security in the frontier districts. Moreover, the alternative policy of entering into treaties with native chiefs was doomed to failure. Even Dr. Philip, who yielded to none in his concern for the rights of native peoples, preferred the retention of the territory under white administration to the doubtful expedient of recognizing the independent sovereignty of the chiefs.

The retrocession of the Province of Queen Adelaide brought back the colonial frontier to the Keiskama River, whilst the tribes in the ceded territory were recognized as British subjects, though they were still to be governed by their chiefs. Andries Stockenstrom, a former *landdrost* at Graaff Reinet, who had explained the shortcomings of the old frontier system, in evidence before a committee of the House of Commons, was sent out as Lieutenant-Governor of the eastern districts, with instructions to conclude with the Xosa chiefs. The function



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was to maintain peace on the frontier, not to provide for the civilization or good government of the tribes. Colonial agents over the border were to be merely invested with diplomatic powers, and charged with the duty of advising the chiefs, where Bantu custom clashed with the interests of the farmers. European colonists entering Kafirland were to be subject to Bantu law.

The treaties failed to avert cattle thefts, or to give the Bantu security in the possession of their land. The so-called "War of the Axe" (1846) made evident the bankruptcy of the old order on the colonial frontier, and prepared the way for a new system. Under Sir Harry Smith, the territory between the Keiskama and the Kei Rivers was annexed to Great Britain. Annexation to the Colony would have meant the possibility of further expropriation of the Bantu in favour of the colonial farmer. But, under the High Commissioner as "Paramount Chief" the territory, now named British Kaffraria, could be set apart as a native reserve.

Smith's policy was a combination of new ideas with old. The ceded territory was now definitely annexed to the Colony as

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the district of Victoria East, and such of it as was not required for the location of the loyal Fingo tribe was sold to European settlers. The frontier was to be guarded by military villages. Within British Kaffraria, European farmers were allowed to occupy land close to the forts, and a régime of strict military control was inaugurated. At the same time, the Rev. Henry Calderwood was permitted to anticipate, in his control of the Fingo location, many of the features of Cape native policy of a later date, notably the experiment of individual land tenure. Across the Keiskama, the chiefs still governed their tribes in accordance with Bantu law, but subject to review of judicial decisions by European magistrates.

The weak point in Smith's experiment was the insufficient inducement offered to the chiefs to submit to encroachments on their authority. The more warlike leaders complied with the Governor's demands only so long as they were impressed with his display of overwhelming military force. When war eventually came, a desperate struggle ensued which was prolonged over the greater part of three years (1850-3).

So long as danger threatened, military

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control was maintained, but, with the appointment of Sir George Grey as Governor and High Commissioner (1854), Smith's ideas of development and colonization of native areas received full expression. As Governor in New Zealand, Grey had endeavoured, not without success, to incorporate colonists and Maori in a single society. The chief obstacle to such an achievement at the Cape was the extensive authority of the chiefs. Grey accordingly proposed, by imperceptible degrees, to replace the power of the chief by that of the white magistrate. His plan was to offer the chiefs a regular stipend in compensation for the loss of the fines previously levied by their courts, the funds for this purpose being made available by the levy of an annual hut tax. So far as the chiefs continued to govern, they would do so as agents of the British Government. The new policy soon proved to be a success. In a few years, criminal jurisdiction became the exclusive province of the white magistrate. The Governor, moreover, took important steps towards ensuring the economic and social welfare of the tribes under his control. He was a pioneer of education for the Bantu and a founder

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of hospital services. Unfortunately, these measures were accompanied by fresh plans for the extension of European settlement in Bantu territory. Grey believed that the readiest means of winning over the tribes to civilization was the deliberate interpenetration of Kaffraria by white settlement. His plantation of German legionaries in the heart of the country could only lead to a legacy of discontent, since it dangerously restricted the amount of land available for location of the various tribes. Only the lamentable incident of the self-destruction of the Xosas and Tembus (1857) made possible his schemes for European colonization. The disaster was a measure of the alarm and unsettlement provoked by Grey's innovations. Disturbed by the threat to Bantu customs and instigated by the emissaries of the wily Moshesh, the Kaffrarian tribes were in a mood to listen to the desperate advice of their "prophets" that they should massacre their cattle and destroy the growing crops. In return for this sacrifice, they were promised the return to life of bygone heroes of the Bantu race, with whose assistance it would be easy to drive the white man into the ocean. Though

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the Fingoes held aloof, the bulk of the *Ciskeian* tribes obeyed the command of the "prophets," with the inevitable result that thousands died of starvation. According to the Kaffrarian census, the population declined in six months from 105,000 to 37,000. Grey did what he could to rush food supplies into the stricken area. He also took advantage of the breakdown in organization of the tribes to push forward the systematic planting of white colonists, and pave the way for the extension of direct magisterial control. Though he did much to promote civilizing influences among the Bantu, Grey, by his confiscation of the land of rebels, increased the congestion across the Kei and prevented the emergence of a relatively compact area of native administration in British Kaffraria.

Meanwhile in Natal, the Lieutenant-Governor and his advisers had begun to grapple with the immensely difficult problem brought about by the alarming influx of natives from Zululand. When the trekkers from the eastern districts of the Cape entered Natal, they found the greater part of the territory unoccupied. The preceding decade had been the period of

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inter-tribal wars of extermination, during which the Zulu King, Chaka, had devastated the greater part of the country which lay behind Zululand, as far as the slopes of the Drakensberg. A few thousand natives, chiefly the remnants of disrupted tribes in the vicinity of the port, represented in 1838 the entire Bantu population of Natal. The occupation of the territory by the Dutch, followed by the destruction of the military power of Chaka's successor, Dingaan, resulted in migration on a large scale from Zululand towards the areas of white settlement. Panda, who displaced Dingaan after the battle of the Blood River, though he protested to the authorities, Dutch and British, at Maritzburg against the admission of refugees from Zululand, was powerless to check a movement which was occasioned by the desire for security and the prospect of white employment. After 1843, it fell to Cloete to recommend measures for the reception and control of the fugitives. As British Commissioner, his instructions were to adjudicate on land claims within Natal, with proper regard for the interests of native occupants. Cloete accordingly proposed to confirm the

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few thousand natives discovered to be in occupation of certain areas in 1838, in the possession of their land, whilst recommending six or more locations for the "intruders." This distinction was not in fact tenable, for many of the "intruders" were tribesmen who had occupied Natal prior to Chaka's raids. In 1843, however, land was still sufficiently plentiful to supply the needs of all, and Martin West, first Lieutenant-Governor, was able to proceed with the demarcation of suitable areas for occupation by the growing native population of the district. Earl Grey's reminder that it was "mainly for the benefit of the native inhabitants of Africa that this Colony is to be maintained" pointed the way to generous endowment which the first Location Commission (1846) was anxious to follow. Unfortunately, native administration was, from the outset, crippled by shortage of funds. The Imperial Government insisted that local revenue must meet all charges, save that of a small military establishment. As in India, "the moral superiority of the European" was to direct "the physical strength of the native race." The Commissioners had recommended the appoint-

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ment of resident superintendents to govern the locations, but Grey was unable to pledge imperial revenues for the purpose of financing European administration within the areas reserved. In its place, he suggested the establishment of tribal government. The local Government was instructed to support and maintain the authority of the chiefs and the prestige of tribal law. The Colonial Secretary contemplated the gradual repeal of the more oppressive provisions of native customary law ; but he considered that, for many years, the Natal authorities would have to look to the chiefs to suppress disorder. These suggestions ignored the fact that the massacres of Chaka had broken up the tribal organization, and brought the government of the chiefs to an end. The establishment of direct rule over the shattered tribes was the only means of ensuring order and security. But the Imperial Government rejected this solution on the ground of economy. There remained only the expedient of keeping the two races, as far as possible, apart. This object accordingly formed the mainspring of Natal native policy. Fortunately, an officer was available who combined

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administrative genius with a rare insight into native mentality. Without Theophilus Shepstone, the European community in Natal might well have met with disaster on an unprecedented scale. About one-sixth of the entire land area had been laid out in locations. It was Shepstone who achieved the removal to these locations of some 80,000 natives, without loss of life, or even the display of military force. There remained the formidable task of reconstituting the broken tribal system. Shepstone gathered together the remnants of the tribes and placed them under the authority of a descendant of the former chiefs. Within each location, native law was brought into operation. At the head of the entire structure stood the Lieutenant-Governor, as "Supreme Chief," with Shepstone as his official mouthpiece.

The difficulties of administration were enhanced by the attitude of the European colonists. Then, as now, the paramount consideration for the white farmer was the adequacy of the supply of native labour. The colonists complained that the locations were too large. They feared that, unless they were reduced in size, the

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natives would grow dangerously formidable in numbers and strength, and more and more disinclined to enter European service. The local Government, however, succeeded in averting any drastic diminution of the reserved areas.

The Shepstone policy in Natal was essentially an attempt to combine native law and government with ultimate European control. Within the locations, chiefs ruled, but as officers of the "Supreme Chief." The proclamation of the latter's authority made it possible to control the administration of justice without infringing the authority which belonged, by Bantu custom, to the individual chief. Outside the locations, the Colonial Courts administered native customary law in cases between, or concerning, natives. Shepstone himself was the executive hand of the Lieutenant-Governor, and his great gifts of understanding and patience enabled him to win the entire confidence of the Bantu. In the later years of his tenure of the office of Secretary for Native Affairs, Shepstone was the real ruler of the native population. His success was mainly due to realization of the fact that the development of the Bantu must

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proceed along distinctive lines. Devoted as he was to the welfare of the native, he was wise enough to perceive that native progress could not be at the expense of genuine European interests.

The problem of security of tenure of location land was left in abeyance for many years. The 1846 Commissioners had recommended the appointment of trustees, with some provision for the conversion of portions of the locations into freehold grants available for natives who had learnt to put the land to its best advantage. Finally, it was decided to establish (1864) a Natal Native Trust, which was simply the Executive Council in a particular capacity, to hold all unalienated location land in trust for the native population as a whole.

Under Shepstone, the inevitable disintegration of tribal institutions was designedly retarded. Not until the 'sixties did it become necessary to devise an alternative status for detribalized natives. The system of exemption from native law, provided in the statutes of 1864-5, gave the educated native an opportunity to free himself from the restrictions of the tribal system, and assume the civil rights

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and obligations of the Roman-Dutch law of the Colony. After seven years' exemption from native law, he might become further qualified for the exercise of the franchise, though the grant was in each case at the discretion of the Governor. Not until 1876 was an application for exemption received, whilst the privilege of the vote has almost invariably been refused.

The early 'seventies were a time of expanding trade and prosperity, but, as the decade wore on, trouble began to threaten over a wide area from the Zoutpansberg to the eastern frontier of the Cape. Native unrest in the borderlands of the Transvaal imperilled the very existence of the northern Republic. Beyond the Tugela, the warlike Cetewayo had rebuilt the military machine which the trekkers had shattered. Whilst the Basuto were restless under magisterial control, the Transkeian tribes were rising in rebellion (1877). In Natal, the first indication that all was not well had been the defiance of a minor chief, Langalibalele (1874), over the registration of firearms. Resistance was soon quelled, but the trial of Langalibalele before a

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court established by the Lieutenant-Governor, in his capacity as "Supreme Chief," revealed some of the deficiencies of Shepstone's system. It had not been contemplated that serious crimes, such as treason and rebellion, would be tried in a court of native law. Yet Lieutenant-Governor Pine had appeared in person among Langalibalele's judges. The inquiry which followed, as a result largely of the strictures of Bishop Colenso, drew the attention of the Home Government to the wide powers vested by native law in the Lieutenant-Governor as "Supreme Chief," and exercised, in fact, by Shepstone as "Great Induna." Changes were accordingly introduced, which aimed at bringing the natives to a greater extent under the influence of civilized law. All criminal offences were henceforth to be tried before the Colonial Courts, whilst a Native High Court was established to hear appeals, in civil cases, from the courts of magistrates (1875). These judicial innovations brought to an end the era of paternal rule, and ushered in a period of official control and legal codification.

War with Cetewayo could not long be averted. The disaster at Isandhlwana

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caused shops to be barricaded and loop-holed in the streets of Maritzburg, but the heroic defence of Rorke's Drift saved the Colony from the horrors of Zulu invasion. The impis were finally overthrown at Ulundi. Not until 1887, however, was Zululand annexed to the British Crown. Ten years later, the country became administratively part of Natal, with the result that the Natal system was extended across the Tugela.

The central principle of that system has been the discouragement of contact between black and white, and the establishment of sympathetic and personal control of the native population.

On the other hand, the main features of the Cape system, as it has developed since the days of Sir George Grey, are the discountenance of the tribal system with its communal tenure of land, and the substitution of magisterial rule. Under Grey and his immediate successors an attempt was made to incorporate the chiefs in the governmental system, so far as it was not possible to transfer their functions to white officials. This is known as the system of direct rule. But, under Rhodes, a new departure was inaugurated. Rhodes

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and his advisers, notably Jan Hofmeyr, proposed to allow natives to manage their own tribal affairs. Under the provisions of the Glen Grey Act, 1894, native councils were established, from which delegates were to be sent at regular intervals to form district councils endowed with powers of taxation and control. The authority of the chief, and the prestige of tribal custom were patently declining, and the plan was to provide an alternative machinery of government. In effect, it substituted indirect for direct white control. Magistrates were to preside over the meetings of district councils, but with a clear realization of the purpose of the new machinery, which was intended to train natives in administration, by giving them a sense of responsibility in the raising and expenditure of money. Extended in course of time throughout the Transkei, the council system has materially helped to substitute prosperity and tranquillity for confusion and discontent. In 1895 a general council for the Transkei came into existence, on which each district council was represented by three native councillors. It has proved an invaluable means of eliciting representative native opinion. Since

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Union, the councils system has become permissive in all parts of the Union.

A second feature of later Cape policy has been the introduction of individual holdings on an improved quit-rent tenure. Communal tenure of the land was regarded as the chief obstacle to agricultural improvement in the territories. The Glen Grey Act offered leases in perpetuity to natives who wished to acquire land in their own right. This provision stayed the process of exhaustion of the natural resources of the land, which was inevitable under the wasteful system of tribal holding. It furnished an adequate inducement to the adoption of measures of permanent improvement, and has been a chief means of native advancement in all districts where it has been adopted.

The concession of the franchise to the natives, on the same terms as to Europeans, had been a notable feature of the constitution ordinance of 1853. The property qualification for voters, was however substantially raised in 1894, and an educational test added. These changes had the effect, which was intended, of reducing the numbers of natives qualified for exercise of the vote, whilst retaining

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the principle of equality. At Union, the number of enfranchised natives did not exceed 8,000, out of a total adult male Bantu population of a quarter of a million.

Meanwhile, the annexation of predominantly native territories to the Cape Colony had somewhat diminished the perils of disunity in the sphere of native administration. The newly-annexed territories, notably Basutoland, did not become fully incorporated in the Colony, but the same general lines of policy were pursued wherever the co-ordinating authority of the Governor-General-in-Council could be applied. There remained, however, the wide discrepancies in outlook as between the two British colonies and the northern Republics, where the policy pursued was one of complete subordination of the native. In the Transvaal, the annexation of 1877 prepared the way for the introduction, under Shepstone's son, Henrique, of the Natal system; but the essential feature of that system—the provision of a reasonably adequate amount of land for locations—was neglected. The danger underlying these differences in treatment of the native was the most effective consideration which

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promoted the eventual achievement of Union.

At Union, no less than when first contact was established between Bantu and European colonist, the Bantu problem was essentially one of land. The demand of the white farmer has always been that the area reserved for the native should be sufficiently restricted to compel him to work for a European master. Until comparatively late in the nineteenth century the locations were by no means crowded. Since Union, the situation has undergone a profound change, and it is doubtful whether one-half of the native population now have, or can possibly be given, homes in the reserves. The congestion within the locations has so diminished the fertility of the land that the majority of their inhabitants have become dependent on wages earned outside. Their condition, however, especially in the compact Transkeian reserve, is far more advantageous than that of the dispersed native. Until 1913, a large number of natives, especially in Natal and the Transvaal, lived as tenants or "squatters" on European farms. The practice of "squatting," however, was peculiarly liable to abuse, and

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the Natives' Land Act of 1913 accordingly sought to prevent natives living on farms, except in the capacity of employed servants. At the same time, it was made illegal for natives to purchase land outside scheduled areas without the express approval of the Government. These provisions were held not to be applicable to the Cape Province. The intention of the framers of the Act was obviously to strengthen the principle of segregation, and to make it difficult for natives to acquire land, except from other natives and within areas already reserved for their use. Nor can there be any doubt that the object in prohibiting natives from leasing or hiring land was to force them to accept service with the farmer. Had the Act been followed up, as was originally intended, by the delimitation of further land for the support of the Bantu population, no great injustice would have been done, for urban areas were excluded from its operation, whilst dispensation to meet individual cases of hardship has been on a fairly generous scale. Unfortunately, such provision has not so far been possible, and the eviction and unsettlement, which the Act brought about, has nursed bitter

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resentment among the natives of the three northern Provinces.

The South Africa Act left the enfranchised native in possession of his vote, but withdrew the nominal right to be elected as a member of the Legislature. Four nominated Senators were, however, to be selected "on the ground mainly of their thorough acquaintance with the reasonable wants and wishes of the coloured races in South Africa." This provision has been found to be inadequate in practice. A much more satisfactory arrangement has been the establishment in 1920 of a permanent Native Affairs Commission to advise the Government. Moreover, conferences of chiefs, and of representatives from native territories, were henceforth to meet together for the discussion of matters of interest to the native population as a whole. The ultimate extension of the system of local self-governing councils to all native areas was contemplated, and has, to a large degree, been carried out.

Meanwhile, the disintegration of Bantu institutions has proceeded at a rapid pace. Loyalty to the chiefs and tribal solidarity have visibly wilted under the influence of

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the economic and social adjustments to which the natives have been exposed. This process of loosening of the old bonds of authority has been largely inevitable. Even the missionaries have contributed to it, inasmuch as their teaching has weakened the cohesion of Bantu social ideas. Nor is the process altogether to be regretted. The maintenance of native institutions in their full strength would have powerfully hindered social improvement. The wisest policy seems to be to allow for the gradual absorption of the civilizing ideas which underlie European administration, whilst conserving the more valuable elements in native tradition. This is partly a function of education. It was the missionaries who brought home to the Europeans their responsibility in the matter of education for the native races of Africa. Lovedale began its career as a seminary of higher learning in 1841. Even now the vast majority of native schools are conducted by missionary agencies. Though missionaries have made mistakes, they have pointed the way to sympathetic understanding of the Bantu mind, and they have insisted on the right of the native to share in the benefits and

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privileges of the community of which he is a member. What is now needed is a policy which will encourage the native to develop his capacity and initiative, whilst maintaining the standards and ideals of white civilization. A policy of justice and co-operation will make it possible for the white man to raise the Bantu into a new world of wider horizons and expanding energies.

CHAPTER V ,

THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION IN SOUTH AFRICA

UNTIL comparatively late in the nineteenth century, South Africa was a country of isolated villages and lonely farmsteads, with scarcely any manufacturing industries and ways of communication suitable only for the ubiquitous ox-waggon. The manner of life and mental outlook of its scattered population were those of the eighteenth century. The development of the natural resources of the country had been greatly retarded by the inaccessibility of the interior. Then suddenly, in the 'seventies with the discovery of diamonds, there came the fierce competition and bustling activity of a new industrial age. The use of the term "Industrial Revolution" as a standard description of the two decades (1875-95) which transformed the economic and social life of the community is appropriate, for,

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in South Africa, the historian is reviewing a definite process of industrial expansion which had as its starting-point the finding of diamonds. At all events, there is here no gradual building up of new forms of economic organization. Two crowded decades sufficed to overthrow the old order of life and sweep the country into the era of competitive industrialism and commercial expansion.

In the Cape Colony, two hundred years after the original establishment of European settlement, pastoral farming was still the most widespread occupation. Little land outside the south-western districts, in the immediate neighbourhood of the capital city, was suitable for intensive agriculture. In the eastern areas of summer rainfall, and outside the Colony on the high veld of the interior, the absence of winter feeding, in conjunction with the difficulties of transport, encouraged nomadic life, in preference to settled farming. Though wool gradually rose to importance in the Cape highlands and beyond the Orange River, cattle raising remained the staple industry of the country as a whole. Frontier custom sanctioned the occupation of farms of 6,000 acres, and

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their abandonment as soon as wasteful use had lessened their fertility. Nevertheless, the gradual rise in the value of the raw materials exported during the first half-century of British rule, indicated a slow but steady development of the resources of the Colony.

This development was partially interrupted by the Great Trek, which deprived the eastern districts of a large proportion of their farming, and particularly their cattle-raising, population. Hitherto, despite the trekking tendency, there had been two comparatively compact areas of European settlement—the south-western grain- and wine-producing districts, and the eastern coastlands radiating round Algoa Bay. The Great Trek broke up this second area of settlement, and attracted the more energetic and enterprising farmers towards the unknown and largely unoccupied north.

The departure of the cattle farmers left vacant land which could be put to more valuable use for the production of wool. Grass was plentiful at the eastern extremity of the Karroo, and the proximity of this district to the rising port at Algoa Bay decreased the difficulties of trans-

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portation. By the year 1850 wool had brought up the proportion of colonial produce shipped at Port Elizabeth (Algoa Bay) to 47 per cent, as compared with only 18 per cent of the total a decade earlier.

Farther north, in the sub-tropical coast-lands of Natal, experiments were being made in the cultivation of cotton. Though Mercantilism was out of fashion, special circumstances made it desirable that cotton of good staple should be grown within the British dominions. In the 'fifties, British mill-owners began to be gravely perturbed at the dependence of their factories on the American harvest. Cotton growing in Natal proved a highly-speculative undertaking, though it experienced a brief boom during the Civil War in America. Disappointed in Natal, merchants began to look farther afield. Extravagant reports of the richness of the country in the vicinity of Lake Ngami, which David Livingstone had discovered in 1849, focused attention on a region hitherto unknown to the white man. Livingstone's great work for southern Africa lay in the evangelistic field. Nevertheless, he agreed to collect information

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as to the resources of south-Central Africa, and particularly its suitability for the cultivation of cotton. These inquiries were largely fruitless, and, in the long run, India proved a more satisfactory source of supply than Africa. Tropical products, however, gained a footing in the low-lying regions of the south-east. Tea and sugar were successfully acclimatized in Natal during the 'sixties, and the difficulties of a labour supply solved by the importation of indentured Indians. Natal's prosperity in the ensuing years was to be largely based on the industry of its Indian population.

The discovery of diamonds offered a more attractive field for the investment of capital, and ushered in the era of industrialism. The first diamond was found near Hopetown in 1867, and the earliest diggings were along the Vaal River, above its confluence with the Orange. The far richer dry diggings were opened out four years later, on farms for which titles had been issued by various Griqua chiefs, as well as by the Government of the Orange Free State. The problem of their ownership and control raised acute difficulties. A portion of the diamondiferous area was

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in the occupation of white farmers. Other parts were practically uninhabited. Of the Griqua chiefs, Nicholas Waterboer had vague territorial rights over a large part of the territory. These rights he was induced by his European agent, David Arnott, to transfer to Great Britain. They were sharply controverted, on behalf of the Free State, by President Brand. Brand could point out that none of the Griqua chiefs had exercised effective authority over the area in dispute. On the other hand, the westward expansion of the Free State had been an irregular process, and the border of the Republic had never been authoritatively defined. Its claim to that part of the territory known as the Campbell lands rested on a very dubious transaction with one of the better-known of the Griqua captains, Adam Kok. Documents which would have gone far to prove the Free State's title to the bulk of the area in dispute were not available. Believing that his case was incontrovertible, Brand sent a magistrate to administer justice on the diggings, and suggested arbitration by the head of a foreign state.

Meanwhile, a somewhat similar dispute

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had arisen as to the ownership of land beyond the Vaal, where diamonds had been found in close proximity to the village of Bloemhof. Here the claimants were the Transvaal Republic and a handful of Batlapin chiefs. Lieutenant-Governor Keate, of Natal, was requested by the Transvaal to adjudicate on the Republic's south-western boundary. Fairly, on the evidence before him, Keate assigned the disputed land to the Batlapin tribe. His ruling convinced Sir Henry Barkly, at the Cape, that Waterboer's title to the southern area was valid, and, on the strength of it, he annexed the territory as Griqualand West. The Governor was convinced on political grounds that Britain, as the paramount power, must control the diamond fields. This view was not shared by the Imperial Government, which was concerned with the immediate problem of bringing to an end the confusion and lawlessness at the diggings. The alternative to British rule seemed to be an independent digger republic. Great Britain acquiesced with reluctance in the annexation, on the understanding that Waterboer's claims were substantially justified. The Cape Colony, moreover,

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was to assume responsibility for the administration of the new territory.

The annexation of the diamond fields aroused bitter resentment in the Republics, and did much to shipwreck the prospects of federation in the 'seventies. But the discovery of the mineral wealth of South Africa was followed by so vast an expansion of the economic life of the country that the way was prepared for a new era of co-operation between the white races, and for the joint development of its resources. The revenue from diamonds, especially when reinforced by the profitable mining of gold, provided the means for railway development, which gradually broke down the isolation and narrow self-sufficiency of the farming communities of the high veld. For a time, the heavy cost of transport limited development, but, with the completion of a railway line connecting the diggings with the Cape, the industrial expansion of the north was fairly launched.

The prospects of fortune-hunting at the diggings brought immigrants of a new type to South Africa. Most of these adventurers came from Great Britain, and the best known of them from the Jewish

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quarter in London's East End. When Barnett Isaacs ("Barney Barnato") reached the diamond fields, the future town of Kimberley was no more than a city of dirty canvas tents with an occasional iron shanty. In partnership with his brother, Harry, Isaacs began to buy up claims. By 1880 he was ready to float the Barnato Diamond Mining Company, which paid a first dividend of 36 per cent. Meanwhile, Alfred Beit and Cecil Rhodes, with the assistance of the financial house of Rothschild, had acquired the majority of the shares in the De Beers mine. When their interests were amalgamated with those of Isaacs, the control of virtually the entire diamond production of South Africa passed into the hands of a single company — the De Beers Consolidated Mines.

The attraction of the mines converted the slow process of expansion of white settlement north of the Orange River into a headlong rush. The movement was partly one of migration of the most active and enterprising men from the towns, and the settled agricultural areas of the Cape Colony and Natal. But there was also a considerable influx of new-comers from all

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the other continents, but especially from Europe. In a single generation (1872-1902) the European population of South Africa was wellnigh quadrupled. South Africa was now experiencing what California and Australia had undergone in earlier decades. As time went on, indeed, the lot of the fortune-hunter at the diamond diggings became increasingly difficult. But, before the stream of migration had begun to slacken, the opening up of gold, and later of copper, mines farther north provided a continuing stimulus for the merchant, the capitalist and the miner. The Transvaal had been a land of rough hamlets and wide-flung pasturage. Generations of solitary pastoral life had inculcated the virtues of bravery, self-resource and a rough hospitality among its farming population. The sudden swarm of nimble-minded financiers, engineers and traders introduced a new element with which the older population was unlikely to assimilate.

Gold had been discovered so early as 1854. The mining of gold, however, presented peculiar difficulties, prior to the invention of the multiple stamp, whilst the heavy cost of transport retarded de-

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velopment. Not until 1875 was primitive machinery used to work the newly-discovered mine at Pilgrim's Rest. Barberton was a more promising centre, but here too development proved unremunerative at a comparatively early stage. The Witwatersrand was found to contain a far greater quantity of auriferous rock. By the year 1886 the immense wealth of the Rand had been realized. At what appeared to be the richest point of the reef, the mining camp of Johannesburg sprung up on the bare wind-swept veld. In a few years the representatives of great financial interests had found their way to the new city. Lionel Phillips arrived on the Rand in 1889. He was followed by others of his compatriots, notably Samuel Marks and Isaac Lewis who were the pioneers of manufacturing industry in the Transvaal. In an incredibly short time, the corrugated-iron sheds, which had hitherto encumbered the building lots of Johannesburg, began to give place to palatial buildings of marble and stucco.

In the long run, the gold mines probably harmed agriculture by offering higher returns for transport-driving, and attracting enterprising young men away from

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the land. The immediate effect, however, was to provide new markets for agricultural produce, and to link up the outlying districts by railway communication with the Rand. The mining industry has supported a higher standard of living throughout South Africa, whilst the accumulation of wealth has made possible the endowment of universities.

The intimate connection between the mining of mineral wealth and the development of European settlement was understood by Cecil Rhodes, and utilized to promote the opening up of the tropical land north of Cape Colony and the Transvaal. Others before him had been impressed with the necessity for establishing trading connections along the ill-defined western boundary of the Transvaal, in order to link up the Colony with south-Central Africa. Livingstone had recognized the importance of the narrow strip of territory between the Republic and the Kalahari desert, through which ran the "missionary road" into the interior. But the activities of missionaries were not altogether acceptable to men who attributed native unrest to their presence among the tribesmen. Moreover, Presi-

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dent Pretorius was anxious to safeguard the natural lines of expansion of the Republic. Karl Mauch had reported rich gold-bearing reefs beyond the Limpopo. Mindful of the future, Pretorius issued a proclamation in 1868, annexing a vast extent of territory to the north and west, from Lake Ngami to the Langeberg. So vast an expansion of republican territory would have closed the northern road through Taungs to Pitsani, on the Molopo River, and barred the future extension of the Cape Colony. The proclamation was, however, disallowed by the British Government, on the doubtful ground that the annexation was "contrary to international procedure." No further attempt was made to settle the vexed question of the Republic's western boundary till 1881, at the conclusion of the first Anglo-Dutch War. The frontier then laid down failed to satisfy the more ardent expansionists. Pioneers began to settle in eastern Bechuanaland, and, presently, Kruger ventured to declare a protectorate over the "republics" of Stellaland and Goshen. It was one of the first official acts of the man who was to hold the presidency of the Republic until its extinction in 1902.

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For the moment, this renewed threat to the "road" was averted by adjustment of the frontier in favour of the Republic, at the Convention of London (1884). Bechuana chiefs, however, continued to complain of republican aggression. The Cape Government decided to despatch Rhodes to Bechuanaland in the capacity of Assistant Commissioner. Rhodes's reports convinced the authorities that force alone could cut the knot. In 1885 Sir Charles Warren was despatched to the Cape with instructions to expel intruders from Bechuana territory. His expedition accomplished its task without bloodshed. North of the Molopo, the land was proclaimed a British protectorate. The southern region, including the western portions of Stellaland and Goshen, were annexed as British Bechuanaland. To Rhodes, the acquisition of Bechuanaland was the first step towards the establishment of British dominion far north into the tropics. Through the fringe of relatively well-watered land along its eastern boundary, a railway could be built on British territory, leading to the lands beyond the Limpopo.

Towards this land of promise the en-

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gineers had been slowly pushing forward their railroads. Before 1859 there were no railways at all ; and, as South Africa is practically without navigable waterways, the clumsy ox-waggon was the only available means of transport. The construction of railroads preceded the discovery of the diamond fields, but they were privately-owned systems, using the standard English gauge. A line was opened as far north as Wellington in 1864, which connected the port with the highly-cultivated south-western areas, but to carry the line up the Hex River Pass and on to the sparsely-populated Karroo was an enterprise attended with considerable engineering difficulties. And not only were the gradients steep. The traffic was problematical. Parts of the "dry veld" produced wool of excellent quality, but wool was not a commodity which demanded rapid transportation to the ports, and farms lay scattered over immense areas which no railroad could profitably supply. The terminus of the system therefore remained at Wellington for a decade, during which the Colony experienced exceptional drought and revenue showed a demoralizing decline. By

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1873 the drought had broken, and the condition of the country again justified expenditure on the improvement of communications. Customs receipts were mounting up, and the insufficiency of the ox-waggon to supply the needs of the rapidly-increasing population at the new diggings was amply demonstrated. The Colony had just attained a responsible government constitution ; and one of the first acts of Mr. Molteno's administration was to buy out the private companies, reduce the gauge and adopt an ambitious scheme of railway construction. Thus encouraged, the engineers carried forward the south-western line to Beaufort West in 1880, and to Kimberley five years later. To give the eastern ports a fair share of the traffic, lines were simultaneously carried north from Port Elizabeth and East London. Lateral communication was inevitably neglected, and, until the second decade of the twentieth century, the agricultural districts of Swellendam and the Breede River had to be content with a privately-owned line joining Mossel Bay with Worcester. The spurt in railroad construction gradually died away in the early 'eighties. The building of three

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main lines, and still more the costs of working under separate management, saddled the Colony with an outlay which it could ill afford, and financial collapse was only averted by the discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand.

In 1881 the Transvaal was still a purely pastoral country dependent for communications on unmetalled roads. The opening of the Rand goldfields immensely stimulated the movement to link up the Republic with its neighbours to the south. The annexation, and subsequent retrocession, of the country had thrown back the cause of political federation, but there remained the possibility of economic union based on the ideal of free trade throughout South Africa. Rhodes was the chief supporter of the policy of a customs union. His alliance with J. H. Hofmeyr enabled him to rally moderate Dutch support in favour of a plan for economic co-operation of all the communities in South Africa. The chief obstacle to success was the unfriendliness of Kruger. The Transvaal President had been ready in 1885, when the finances of his country had been in grave disorder, to discuss railway and tariff problems. But the amazing dis-

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coveries on the Rand made him largely independent of the British colonies to the south. Railways indeed were essential for the transport of the heavy machinery required for the crushing of the ore, but Kruger preferred to negotiate with a European syndicate for the construction of a line leading eastward towards Portuguese territory. The colonial lines were pushed ahead with feverish haste to the Transvaal frontier, but at that point a halt was called. Though he eventually allowed these lines to be linked up with the Rand, Kruger regarded them as a threat to the independence of the Republic. Nor was he prepared to see a large share of the traffic to the Rand falling to one or other of the colonial administrations. He accordingly refused to co-operate with the South African Customs Union, which the Cape and the Free State had formed in 1889, and he proceeded to make an arrangement with the Netherlands Railway Company under which 85 per cent of the receipts along the newly-completed (1894) Delagoa Bay line should be handed over to the Government of the Republic. He was prepared to offer the Cape a quarter-share in the Rand traffic. This was not

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unnaturally refused. Kruger continued to be unhelpful, and, to avoid the prohibitive rates levied over the forty miles of line owned by the Netherlands Company, Cape merchants resorted to transport by waggon from Viljoen's Drift to the Rand. The attempt to close the drifts (1895) against goods from overseas was a breach of earlier agreements which the Imperial Government was prepared to make a *casus belli*. Though Kruger withdrew from an untenable position, the struggle for control of the Rand traffic continued. A railway line had been carried north through Mafeking towards Mashonaland where Rhodes and Jameson were engaged in laying the foundations of a new British dominion. On all sides railways were drawing South Africa together into a single economic unit, with the Witwatersrand as its natural centre. The isolation of the Republics was a thing of the past. From being the poorest community in the sub-continent, the Transvaal had in ten years risen to be the wealthiest. Moreover, the increasing dependence of the other states upon the prosperity of the Transvaal gold mines was a potent argument in favour of press-

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ing forward the commercial unification of the whole country. Eventually, as Jan Brand had prophesied, South Africa was to be federated by its railways, but not before the distrust engendered by conflicting political and social ideals had hurled the country into the vortex of civil war.

Coal has played a part in the process of industrialization. The presence of rich coalfields in Natal and the Transvaal was of great advantage to the gold-mining industry. The working of iron and steel is a much later development. Iron ore had been smelted by primitive means for more than a century, but there are no clear signs that South Africa can yet compete with the older centres of industry in the production on a large scale of iron and steel.

As in the older countries of Europe, the transition to industrialism in South Africa has been accompanied by a transformation of agriculture. The old economy had been one of mere subsistence. There were no extensive wheat-growing lands ; and, except in the south-western districts of the Cape, agriculture had always been subsidiary to cattle raising. The discovery of gold and diamonds meant an

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almost unlimited market for agricultural products. With the sudden increase in population, the land became immensely more valuable. Even in the sparsely-populated Free State, land in the 'nineties was no longer available in sufficient quantities to provide farms for every member of a farmer's family. Excessive subdivision produced uneconomic units, and, in conjunction with the disasters of war, drought and disease, was responsible for the emergence of a "poor white class" in South Africa. With the increasing use of machinery and the erection of jackal-proof fencing to protect the stock, the demand for white agricultural labour declined. Whilst many of the dispossessed labourers flocked to the towns, others became *bijwooners* or tenants on shares—a system akin to the older *métayage* of France and Italy. The *bijwooners* had no special inducement to maintain efficiency and still less to improve the land. Their numbers are now declining. As land-owners have gradually come to need more land for their own use, tenancies have been terminated, and the exodus of landless Europeans from the rural areas has proportionately increased.

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Whilst the expansion of the gold-mining industry attracted population to the Rand, the opportunities for employment soon began to fall short of the needs of the ever-increasing body of immigrants from the *platteland*. It was not only the white man who had begun to feel the acute shortage of land. The rush of landless whites to the towns was paralleled by the steady drift of the native from the over-crowded reserves towards the centres of European employment. In the post-Union period, competition for employment between black and white seemed to threaten the maintenance of civilized standards of life. Trade unionism was well developed on the Rand, and the policy of its leaders was to enforce a colour bar in the employment of mining labour. Skilled occupations had in fact always been reserved for Europeans, but in 1921 many white men were being employed at high wages on work which could be competently performed by natives. The decision of the Chamber of Mines to employ coloured men on semi-skilled jobs produced the bitter struggle of 1922, which all but developed into a revolution. By proclaiming martial law and concentrating

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units of the Defence Force, the Government was able to suppress disorder, but discontent was not allayed. Two years later, a change of ministry occurred, after an election at which the major issue had been the competition of the native in European industry. The new Government, under General Hertzog, proceeded to introduce a Colour Bar Bill, which became law in 1926, as the Mines and Works Amendment Act. The Act empowered the Minister to enforce differentiation in the class of work done by labour of different colours. Its promoters declared that the Act was necessary to protect white standards of civilization. Nevertheless, it is difficult to defend an enactment which prohibits a man from doing work merely on the ground of colour.

The existing gold mines are a rapidly-wasting asset, and will probably cease to contribute materially towards the revenue of the country after 1947. But, in October 1932, geologists, using the new method of magnetic measurement, were able to announce that they had traced the westward extension of the main reef some forty miles beyond its previously known limit. The value of the reef in this new

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area remains to be tested by the sinking of boreholes. But if results are favourable, the opening up of an immense new area will safeguard the mining and industrial supremacy of the Witwatersrand, and probably lead to a new era of South African prosperity.

In Europe, the transition to industrialism was the starting-point of a process which gradually transferred political and economic power from the privileged aristocracy of the pre-revolutionary régime to the working masses. A revolution of this nature still lies in the future in South Africa. The forces of industry and commerce have not materially modified the attitude of the white man towards the black proletariat. There has been a steady extrusion of the native worker even from avenues of unskilled employment, in order to provide work, in times of depression, for indigent Europeans. Recently, industries which undertake to employ a maximum of European labour have been singled out for special tariff protection. Owing to the insufficiency of land in the reserves, thousands of natives have inevitably flocked to the towns, only to find that fields of industrial labour are closed more

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and more against their entry. As regards skilled employment, the position of the detribalised native is naturally worse, for no facilities for technical training are available for him. The whole process is not without danger to the white worker. The employment of low-paid native labour in unskilled jobs makes possible an exceptionally high standard of life for the white artisan. If preference for white labour, on an uneconomic basis, is pushed too far, it must result in diminished output, and eventually in reduction of the earnings of the white man also.

It is the opinion of many observers that South Africa will be confronted before long by a second industrial revolution which will involve a transition from the era of white economic supremacy to one of free competition between the races. Restrictions on the native's right to use his abilities to the best advantage in the labour market must, it is claimed, be removed. In the long run, the criterion of efficiency will determine the earnings of European and Bantu. Certain it is that the economic position of the native must be raised if the Union is to continue to prosper. This fact the average European does not

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yet realize. He visualizes the situation as a struggle to preserve white standards of civilization. But there is no necessary clash of interests between black and white. At present, native labour, being in many cases grossly underpaid, is wasteful. An increase in the level of native wages will eventually mean an expanded market for the Union's manufactures, and an augmentation of wealth, from which every section of the community will derive advantage. But such an increase can only come about if the scope of native employment is widened.

CHAPTER VI

TOWARDS A SOUTH AFRICAN DOMINION

THE increasing prosperity of Cape Colony in the 'fifties was reflected in the growth of the capital city. Expanding trade justified expenditure on new jetties and lighthouses. Gas illumination was an innovation of the preceding decade ; and, though Lady Duff Gordon found Cape Town "neither drained nor paved" (1861), she was impressed with the dignity of its high-stoeped buildings.

This prosperity died away in the 'sixties. All had been well during the governorship of Sir George Grey, but his successor, Sir Philip Wodehouse, had to contend with a prolonged drought which rapidly converted a surplus into an accumulating deficit. Moreover, Wodehouse had no faith in the parliamentary institutions which he was called upon to work. He did not believe that Cape Colony, with its large native population, especially after the annexation

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of British Kaffraria, differed materially from dependencies of the Crown Colony type, where government was necessarily autocratic. Representative government had merely revealed the acute divisions within the European community, for the Assembly reflected the hostility between east and west, at a time when South Africa needed above all unity and co-ordination. Wodehouse accordingly proposed to strengthen the official element at the expense of the elective, and to use his authority as High Commissioner to check the disruptive tendencies, which he found so strongly at work, not only in the Cape Legislature, but throughout the country stretching north as far as the Zoutpansberg.

In Britain, attention had been drawn to the mounting costs of armaments, which rendered imperative some reduction in the military establishments of the colonies. The Indian Mutiny had followed closely on the conclusion of the Crimean War. The ambition of Napoleon III, encouraged by the cession to France of Savoy and Nice, and the threatening attitude of Bismarck towards Denmark, involved the possibility of a general European struggle, from which

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Britain would be unable to hold aloof. War broke out in the 'sixties in North America and the Far East. The weight of naval and military expenditure to meet the ever-recurring crises, and to safeguard vital British interests, could only be born by the ruthless reduction of estimates for colonial garrisons. It became the settled policy of the Imperial Government that colonies which enjoyed a considerable measure of self-government should be required to contribute towards the cost of local defence. Some measure of relief to the British Exchequer was imperative. At the same time, it was not thought desirable that self-governing colonies should lean too heavily on the Mother Country. Few had any desire to hasten separation, but, for many years, public opinion had been moving in the direction of liberalism and parliamentary democracy; and this trend of opinion influenced colonial policy by the encouragement which it afforded to those who favoured the concession of full responsible control to colonial legislatures.

South Africa, however, was scarcely ready in the 'sixties for undivided control of its own internal affairs. The policy of the Conventions (1852–4) had broken

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up political unity, and removed the less settled of the white communities from British control. Outside the Colony, the European communities were too weak and unstable to be entrusted with entire responsibility for the maintenance of peace and order. The Colonial Office therefore agreed with Wodehouse that the time had not come for the withdrawal of British troops from South Africa, though it was not equally satisfied that co-ordination could only be achieved through the maintenance, undiminished, of the authority of the Governor, and his ministers. So long as the depression continued, the Imperial Government was prepared to support Wodehouse, for the Governor was doing his best to restore the finances, despite the opposition of the Legislature to additional taxation. But, in 1870, the drought broke, and with signs of returning prosperity, the opposition to the Governor hardened. An election went against his scheme for increased executive control. Inasmuch as the Assembly insisted on maintenance of its authority, harmony could only be restored through the surrender of the Executive. Fortunately Wodehouse's term of office was at an end,

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and his successor, Sir Henry Barkly, was a supporter of responsible government. It only remained to overcome the distrust of the Eastern Province which had consistently agitated for some measure of provincial autonomy. In 1872, responsible government carried the day in the Cape Legislature. The principle was not unwelcome at Downing Street. The British Government had begun to regard federation as a means of achieving a co-ordinated policy in South Africa, and the concession of self-government to the Cape as the oldest and wealthiest community in the sub-Continent, was an essential preliminary to federation. The new constitution brought to an end the period of executive irresponsibility. Under J. C. Molteno, the first parliamentary ministry in South Africa began to remodel the institutions of the Colony in such a way that the old divisions, geographical and racial, were ultimately extinguished.

The opening up of the diamond fields brought wealth to the whole country and made federation a statesmanlike conception. It had already been suggested (1858) by Sir George Grey. A union of federated states, with a general legislature and a

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responsible ministry, was, however, no better than a chimera in the 'fifties, when the Cape Colony was neither willing nor able to shoulder the major burden of federal expenditure. Rapid communications were a *sine qua non* of any sane federative proposal, in an immense territory with so sparse a European population, and, until the discovery of mineral wealth in the north, railway development was beyond the means of the colonial authorities. It might be true, as Grey pointed out, that political disunion intensified the common native menace; but there was no guarantee that any federal government which might be established would be strong enough effectively to control the native races, or even to achieve harmony within the federated group. But, in the 'seventies, railway communications began to facilitate co-operation. The rapid developments in the north drew together the various South African states. Financial unification became a partially accomplished fact, as a result of the enterprise of the Standard Bank of South Africa. Opinion, both at the Cape and in the Free State, became increasingly favourable to political federation. In London, proposals

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which involved the extension of the colonial frontier were no longer categorically rejected. The British Government had sanctioned the annexation of the diamond fields conditionally on the assumption by the Cape of the responsibility for the cost of its administration. Federation would simplify the problem of defence, and prepare the way for the withdrawal of Great Britain from direct responsibility for South African affairs.

In the 'sixties, imperial sentiment had been at a low ebb. A more vigorous policy of colonial development followed the success at the polls of the Conservative Party, 1874, under Benjamin Disraeli. The new Colonial Secretary, Lord Carnarvon, had already been associated with the policy of imperial consolidation, which had brought together the scattered Canadian colonies to form a great federated Dominion. He anticipated for Canada a brilliant period of political and economic expansion, consequent upon the attainment of unity. In South Africa, the dangers of disunion seemed to him even greater. It was natural that he should regard federation as imperative for the purpose of harmonizing the native policies

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of the various white communities. At the Cape, so early as 1871, Sir Henry Barkly had appointed a commission to examine the feasibility of federation. Though Dutch resentment at the annexation of Griqualand West had alienated public opinion in the Republics, there were many who could see no other way out of the difficulties which beset South Africa. The campaign started not un-hopefully. J. A. Froude, Carnarvon's unofficial envoy, after an inspection of the diamond fields, reported in favour of the Free State's claims to the territory. He advised the settlement of outstanding questions in conformity with South African sentiment. Carnarvon accordingly proposed the summoning of a conference in South Africa to discuss native policy and other matters of common interest. His despatch was a strange compound of wisdom and error. He judiciously refrained from pressing upon the South African communities the views of the Imperial Government. Confederation, or union, was to be discussed only if it should arise spontaneously "in the course of the free interchange of communications." But he made an egregious

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blunder when he suggested the names of those who might be asked to represent the Cape Colony at the conference. Nor did he take J. C. Molteno's responsible ministry into his confidence prior to publication of the despatch. Now, Molteno had reason to fear that the issue of federation would revive the old controversies between east and west. He and his colleagues, moreover, were disposed to reject any schemes which might involve the Colony in responsibility for the government and defence of adjacent communities. Carnarvon affirmed that he had no desire to dictate a policy to the Cape Government. Fröude's behaviour, however, lent colour to the suggestion that Britain was disregarding the privileges of a self-governing colony. His second visit was in an official capacity, for Carnarvon had nominated him as representative of Great Britain at the conference which he hoped to bring about on South African soil. On his arrival at Cape Town, Froude was informed by Molteno that Ministers considered federation to be inopportune. Refusing to accept the considered judgment of the Cape Government, he endeavoured to mobilize public opinion

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against Molteno in the constituencies. The campaign, unconstitutional as it was, nearly achieved its end. The Assembly refused to condemn Froude's activities, and only the decision of Lord Carnarvon to transfer the proposed conference to London saved the colonial ministry from the danger of a parliamentary defeat.

Carnarvon now began to turn his attention to the north. British statesmen had long been anxious to acquire the Portuguese port of Delagoa Bay. Froude had assured Carnarvon that, so long as the way lay open through Delagoa Bay for the intervention of foreign Powers in South Africa, neither Republic would move in the direction of federation. President Mac-Mahon's arbitration (June 1875) confirmed Portugal in her possession of the port and its immediate surroundings. Delagoa Bay remained therefore a possible stepping-stone for the colonial ambitions of a Power which had begun to show an interest in the affairs of the sub-Continent. What Carnarvon feared was the declaration of a German protectorate over the Transvaal. Henceforth, it became a settled point of British policy that the northern Republic should not be allowed to make further

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territorial advances in the direction of the Indian Ocean.

Information that its President, the Rev. T. F. Burgers, had succeeded in negotiating a loan for the construction of a railway line to the Portuguese frontier was disquieting to British officials. But in the uneasy relations which existed between the Republic and the Swazi and Bapedi tribes, Carnarvon discerned a more immediate threat to British interests ; for territorial acquisitions in this direction would bring the republican frontier close to the sea in the vicinity of St. Lucia Bay.

In these circumstances, there was born in the minds of certain British statesmen the conclusion that nothing short of annexation of the northern Republic would safeguard Imperial interests from the dangers of foreign intervention. The Republics, on the other hand, were naturally concerned to "break the cordon" which was being drawn around them. In pursuance of this policy, Burgers had conceived the idea of foreign alliances. The Republic, however, was in grave financial difficulties. It was impossible to raise an adequate loan in foreign capitals, whilst financial aid could only be obtained

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in London on condition that the Transvaal entered into confederation with the British Colonies. In 1876, Burgers was a declared opponent of the policy of federation. Meanwhile, anarchy prevailed in the Zoutpansberg district, where the Bapedi chief, Secocoeni, defied the republican authorities. Along the eastern frontier, the Swazi were restless, whilst a more formidable enemy, the Zulu Cetewayo, was threatening trouble farther south. News of these developments was not unwelcome at Downing Street. The London Conference had done nothing to forward federation, which Molteno and Brand alike had refused even to discuss. But if the Transvaal could be persuaded to enter a north-eastern confederation, as the price for British assistance in her native wars, the Cape Colony and the Free State were unlikely to hold aloof. Carnarvon looked to the Secocoeni war to convince all but irreconcilable republicans that the maintenance of independence could be purchased at too heavy a price. In August (1876), a republican commando was obliged to retreat in disorder. At the Cape, Sir Henry Barkly anticipated an immediate request to take over the govern-

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ment of the country. His despatches convinced Carnarvon that annexation was inevitable. He hastily cautioned Barkly to proceed with care, whilst neglecting no opportunity of acquiring the Transvaal peaceably. At the same time, he commissioned the Natalian, Theophilus Shepstone, "the man who has the most intimate knowledge of South African affairs," to proceed to Pretoria and take over the administration, provided that circumstances should be favourable.

Shepstone reached Pretoria in January 1877 to find the country in a state of indescribable confusion. He was attended by no more than twenty-five troopers, and resistance would have been easy had his intervention been generally resented. Burgers and many of his colleagues, however, now despaired of the Republic. Shepstone did his best to explore other ways out of the difficulty, but the administrative reforms which he proposed were summarily rejected by the Volksraad. There can be no doubt that he honestly felt that annexation was desired by a majority of the burghers. When he eventually ran up the British flag (April 12), his action was received quietly and

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with many expressions of satisfaction and relief. Not until a later date did any general feeling of resentment emerge.

Shepstone, however, had promised that the Transvaal should remain a separate government with some measure of legislative autonomy. In disregard of this promise, the Colonial Office decided to administer the territory as a crown colony. Shepstone's personal popularity sufficed at first to hold in check the republican opposition. But the boom in trade passed away, whilst Cetewayo's truculence threatened renewal of trouble along the frontier. Many had acquiesced in British sovereignty under the impression that financial support would relieve them of the necessity for payment of taxes. But Carnarvon was insistent on the need for economy, and when Lanyon, Shepstone's successor, began to collect taxation, discontent became formidable.

The outbreak of the Zulu War did not help matters, for the disaster at Isandhlwana impaired British military prestige. The reverses to British arms seemed to provide the Transvaalers with an opportunity to regain their independence. By the year 1880 public opinion had swung

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round in favour of repudiation of British control. The immediate difficulties of the country had been solved, and credit re-established. When Disraeli's administration made way for its opponents (1880), the Transvaalers, who had been encouraged to look to the Liberal Party for support, anticipated the immediate restoration of independence. But Gladstone was led to believe that retrocession would mean civil war, and the possibility of oppression of the native inhabitants. He readily promised self-government, but he would not sanction the withdrawal of British authority. Thereupon, the sullen resentment of the farmers blazed into armed insurrection. The clever marksmanship of the Dutch, and their knowledge of the mountainous country which lay between Ladysmith and the Transvaal border, enabled them to surprise and outmanœuvre small British forces advancing from Newcastle. At Majuba, Colley, with one hundred of his men, were slain in an attempt to cover the Laing's Nek pass into northern Natal. It was an insignificant encounter, but it served to re-establish the military prestige of the republicans, which had suffered from the

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disastrous expeditions against Secocoeni. Gladstone's Government was unwilling to employ the overwhelming forces of the Empire against the little Republic, and, in August 1881, by the Pretoria Convention, the Transvaal was granted complete self-government under British suzerainty. Three years later, the Convention was revised, the assertion of suzerainty being dropped, in return for the promise that all European inhabitants should be entitled to civil rights, and equality of taxation. The Republic, however, was not to conclude any treaty, save with the Free State, without the approval of the Crown.

Meanwhile, federation had been definitely rejected in the south. In October 1876, Sir Bartle Frere had been selected by Lord Carnarvon as Governor and High Commissioner at the Cape, with definite instructions to promote a wide scheme of confederation. Frere came to South Africa with a record of distinguished service in India and possessing the full confidence of the Imperial Government. Believing that British sovereignty must be extended sooner or later over the Republics, Frere accepted Shepstone's an-

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nexionation of the Transvaal. But for several months, he had little time to devote to the affairs of the north. The outbreak of the Transkeian war demanded his undivided attention. In the middle of the campaign, Molteno and his ministers began to quarrel with the Governor with regard to the command of the colonial forces. In February 1878, Frere dismissed his Premier, and called upon the Easterner, Gordon Sprigg, to form a ministry. When the danger from the tribes had passed away, Frere and Sprigg began to work together to promote federation. A general election at the close of the year gave the new Premier a substantial majority. But the horizon was already darkened by the gathering war clouds in Zululand. Frere was convinced that a general rising of the Bantu tribes against white dominion was imminent. His attempt to bring matters to a head, by addressing an ultimatum to Cetewayo, has been referred to in an earlier chapter. Frere did not expect Cetewayo to submit, but he believed that the pacification of South Africa was impracticable without a final settlement with the Zulu monarch. Zulu militarism he regarded as a malignant growth to which

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palliative treatment could not safely be applied. His judgment was probably sound, but public opinion in England was not prepared for a serious campaign in which disastrous losses might be incurred. The Disraeli Cabinet ruled that Frere had unwisely precipitated the war. Ministerial resentment found expression in an official censure, followed by the appointment of Sir Garnet Wolseley as Special High Commissioner for South-East Africa. Though Frere was to remain as Governor and High Commissioner for the Colony, and its dependencies, his prestige was grievously damaged by these indications of official disapprobation. He retained, however, the goodwill of the Cape Ministry. Sprigg and his colleagues were still prepared to go forward with the policy of federation, but in June 1880 they failed to carry a resolution through the Legislative Assembly suggesting the holding of a conference to discuss union. The check was decisive, and, in August, Frere was recalled.

The failure to achieve federation must be attributed to the exasperation of Afrikaner sentiment over the whole period 1871–81. The disastrous decade awakened Dutch national consciousness throughout South

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Africa, and inspired it with antagonism towards the British Empire. Suspicion and resentment, born of the annexation of the Diamond Fields, had been revived by the unhappy experiences of the Transvaal. Annexation may have been unavoidable in 1877, but the failure to implement promises of self-government was inexcusable. The autocratic and unsympathetic administration of Lanyon and Wolseley inevitably increased the anti-British rancour. Resentment was scarcely less bitter in the Dutch-speaking districts of the Cape Colony. The Imperial Government, indeed, had been inspired by a sincere idea of South African unity. It had proceeded on the assumption that salvation was to be found through the attainment of political unity and local self-government, and by reconciliation of the rights of the various inhabitants. Unfortunately, no British minister appreciated the depth of Afrikaner passion for political independence.

In opposition to Imperialism, colonial public opinion began to declare itself in favour of complete autonomy. Lord Carnarvon, inasmuch as he had approached the subject of South African confederation

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from the standpoint of Imperial policy, had pursued a retrograde policy. In the 'eighties, men like Sir Hercules Robinson and Cecil Rhodes agreed with the moderate Dutch leaders that South African problems must be settled by South Africans, and not by the Colonial Office. Not only was direct Imperial rule repudiated, but South African statesmen, for the most part, held aloof from the new movement of Imperial Federation, which aimed at strengthening the bonds of Empire by the creation of some form of common council for Great Britain and the self-governing Colonies. Even in the sphere of native administration, the Cape Colony and Natal were quick to resent any suggestion of external control. South Africa was groping towards the conception of Dominion status.

Unfortunately, racial antipathy delayed the evolution of a common sentiment of South African nationhood. Events in the Transvaal had given birth to republicanism, as a political faith which appealed to many Dutch-speaking colonists in all parts of South Africa. In 1879, S. J. du Toit organized the Afrikaner Bond with a strong anti-British bias. Du Toit's

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original interest had been the promotion of the Afrikaans language, but the Transvaal War brought political aims to the forefront, and encouraged the leaders of the Bond to demand an independent United States of South Africa. These ideals failed to win support in the Cape. Men like J. H. Hofmeyr, who presently attained to leadership of the Bond Party in the old Colony, were content to accept the British connection as in the best interests of South Africa. Hofmeyr and Rhodes joined hands in the Colony to achieve a reconciliation of the ideals of Dutch and British, based on absolute equality, and the principle of colonial self-government. Guided by Hofmeyr, and with the sympathetic support of Rhodes, the Bond quickly secured the official recognition of the Dutch language in the law courts and in Parliament. Racial feeling largely disappeared from Cape politics, whilst its strength in the Transvaal alienated the sympathies of the older community.

Rhodes's chief interests lay in the north. His election to the Cape Assembly took place in 1880. Inasmuch as he subscribed to the ideal of colonial autonomy, and was ready to spare no pains to establish sub-

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stantial equality as between Dutch and British, he had associated himself with those who emphasized the paramount importance of South African interests and of a sane South African nationalism. But Rhodes was, at the same time, an Imperialist. He believed that British policy combined freedom with unity, and his life was devoted to the task of making British influence supreme in Africa. The acquisition of Bechuanaland belonged to the period when Rhodes was a political freelance, company promoter and commercial magnate, rather than South African statesman. But, even in his undergraduate days, Rhodes had reflected deeply on the political future of southern Africa. He realized that the retrocession of the Transvaal, following the British disaster at Majuba, had encouraged the Dutch burghers to regard the country to the north of the Limpopo as their destined heritage. Only through Bechuanaland could the Cape Colony now expand into the vast, undeveloped spaces which Rhodes liked to refer to as "the dominant north." The successful issue of Sir Charles Warren's expedition frustrated Kruger's plan to build a wall of republican territory from Delagoa Bay to

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Lake Ngami. By securing Bechuanaland for the Empire, Rhodes simultaneously administered a rebuff to German ambitions which undoubtedly included the extension of the German west coast protectorate to meet the Transvaal border. Further he could scarcely go without the official support of the Cape Colony. This was forthcoming in 1890, when Rhodes became Prime Minister. His first object was to persuade the Cape Legislature to occupy the colonial hinterland to the north and north-east, with a view to the political and economic unification of Africa south of the Zambezi. He had already sent his agents to Lobengula, chief of the Matabele, and obtained from that cautious potentate the promise not to cede any part of his territory, save to Great Britain ; and eight months later, a mineral concession over the whole of Matabeleland (1888). The concession brought Rhodes's dream of a great British dominion beyond the Zambezi within the sphere of practical politics. The Cape Assembly eventually agreed to take over British Bechuanaland and Wal-fish Bay, but Rhodes complained that colonial politicians were timid and parochial. Recognizing that the Imperial

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Government could not be persuaded to undertake the expensive task of occupying further territory, Rhodes had planned the formation of a company to work the concession and develop the interior, under a charter from the Crown. On 29 October, 1889, the charter was granted to the British South Africa Company, conferring immense powers over a territory without northward limit. Rhodes therefore entered upon his ministerial responsibilities at Cape Town, knowing that he could mobilize large resources, through the Chartered Company, for the purposes of imperial expansion. He was determined that the Colony should "hold the keys of the interior" as the preliminary to the foundation of a British South African state stretching from Table Mountain to Lake Tanganyika.

Rhodes's activities must be viewed in the light of the international situation which followed the Berlin Conference (1885) and the establishment of the Congo Free State. Livingstone and Stanley had blazed the trail for the extension of European influence in the still largely unknown interior of Central Africa. By the year 1890, Rhodes had frustrated the

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attempt of the Transvaal to overflow its boundaries westward, but he had failed (and was to fail again definitely in 1894) to buy or lease Delagoa Bay. There remained, moreover, the danger that, despite his agreements with Lobengula, the territory to the north of the Limpopo would fall to German or Portuguese enterprise. In the struggle for economic and political control of south-Central Africa, Rhodes, through his lieutenants, C. D. Rudd and L. S. Jameson, had nevertheless gained a long start over his European rivals, for his relations with Lobengula and the mobilized resources of the Chartered Company enabled him to push forward a pioneering expedition into Mashonaland. Here the Company forestalled the Portuguese, and established a claim to the valuable gold-fields at Manica. Manica lay on the edge of the eastern escarpment, and, according to early maps, belonged to the legendary "Emperor of Monomotapa," with whom the Portuguese claimed to have made an agreement in the sixteenth century. Whilst Rhodes was acquiring concessions in Lobengula's territory, the emissaries of the Portuguese Mozambique Company were first in the field in eastern Mashonaland.

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Only the swift progress of Rhodes's pioneer column frustrated Portuguese designs, and established the Chartered Company in possession of the Manica gold-fields. The eastern and northern boundaries of the Company's territories were eventually defined by agreements (1890-3) with both Portugal and Germany.

In developing his plans for the occupation of Matabeleland and Mashonaland, Rhodes had a double object. He had come to believe in the feasibility of a British economic bloc stretching north to the Great Lakes, and with an "all red" line of communication connecting the Cape with Egypt. He believed that the greater part of the interior south of Lake Tanganyika was admirably suited for white settlement, and that, without this valuable hinterland, the British possessions in the south could never attain a position of dominance. It was clear to him that whichever power held the central plateau of southern Africa would be able to command a virtually limitless field of expansion. It was the conviction that British rule alone safeguarded justice for native races and tended to promote ideals of liberty which made him resolve to devote all his energies to the

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extension of British dominion in the “dark continent.” At the same time, Rhodes earnestly desired to promote unification in South Africa itself. He fully realized the importance of the South African Dutchman as a pioneer and settler, and he was convinced that the co-operation of both white races was essential in order to weld the scattered fragments of white South Africa into a stable whole. Rhodes’s federation scheme took into account the necessity for the co-operation of the two Republics in the building up of a self-reliant South African dominion. In the early ’nineties, the Transvaal remained hostile to that conception; but Rhodes believed that the establishment of a new and wealthy state in the north would compel the Republic to enter into economic, and later political, union with her neighbours.

He, therefore, pushed forward, despite trouble with the Matabele, occupation of the territory which was presently (1895) to be christened “Rhodesia,” linking up its scattered settlements by railroad and telegraph with Mafeking and the Cape. Aware of the personal hostility of Kruger, he could not at first believe that the

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Transvaal President would be an immovable obstacle to any sane scheme of South African federation. But Kruger was steadfast in his belief that Dutch supremacy could be attained. His object was to create a solid bloc of Boer territory within which his burghers could live the pastoral life of generations of trek-boers, secure in the enjoyment of a monopoly of political representation. But the Republic could not live entirely without reference to the needs and interests of its neighbours. Kruger's attempt to cut the commercial communications of the Transvaal with the Cape Colony received a sharp reverse when the Imperial Government, on the advice of Rhodes, refused to allow the Vaal drifts to be closed against goods from oversea transported over the Cape railways. Rhodes, on the other hand, could not achieve the federation of South Africa under the British flag so long as the Transvaal adhered to its policy of political and economic isolation. As Prime Minister of the Cape, he had succeeded, with the help of Jan Hofmeyr, in drawing British and Dutch together as willing partners in the development of colonial prosperity. This great work brought him into inevit-

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able conflict with Kruger. What Rhodes feared was the growth of racial antipathy in the Transvaal, and unwise discrimination against English-speaking settlers. The London Convention had promised equality of treatment to all white inhabitants "conforming themselves to the laws of the South African Republic." Kruger claimed that he had fulfilled this obligation by securing the life and property of the immigrants. Admittedly it had not been stipulated that the *uitlanders*, as they were termed, should enjoy full burger rights. So large a concession could not reasonably have been expected. Though the mines attracted settlers from many countries, the bulk of the new-comers were British subjects, who were not unnaturally suspected of lukewarm attachment to the republican institutions of the Transvaal. Remembering the annexation "plot" of 1877, Kruger and his advisers were inclined to anticipate that the *uitlanders* would give their support to any fresh design against the Republic's independence. *Uitlanders* were accordingly denied the parliamentary and municipal franchise. Moreover, the increase in their numbers brought with it a progressive worsening of their status, for

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Kruger viewed with resentment and alarm the continued influx of Englishmen into the Transvaal. In the early years of the gold rush, the Government had dealt fairly with the immigrants. Taxation was light, and the franchise could be obtained after five years' residence in the Republic, a period which did not exceed that required for naturalization in the United Kingdom. In the 'nineties, however, vexatious legislation accumulated. Uitlanders, though without even municipal rights, were called upon to bear arms in conflicts with native tribes. They lacked facilities for the education of their children save in the State Schools, where Dutch alone was used. All white inhabitants enjoyed indeed free access to the Courts, but the latter were not yet independent of Executive dictation. Moreover, the administration of the Republic was riddled with corruption and nepotism. Profitable monopolies in the hands of officials imposed grievous burdens on the mining industry. At the same time only a very small fraction of the revenue raised by taxation from the uitlanders was expended upon improvements on the Rand.

In 1892, the Transvaal National Union, organized by Charles Leonard and other

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leaders, provided machinery for the proper formulation of uitlander grievances. For three years, the Union was content to proceed by constitutional methods. Kruger, however, rejected petitions with contempt, whilst the Volksraad again revised the electoral laws, making impossible (September 1893) any extension of the franchise which did not meet with the approval of two-thirds of the enfranchised burghers. The Volksraad's action served to convince the uitlander leaders that Kruger was irreconcilable. Rhodes, meanwhile, had been waiting upon events. The incident of the Vaal drifts had convinced him that the Republican Government was persistently hostile to the Cape Colony, and an obstacle to the co-operation of the various white communities in South Africa. He was prepared to give financial assistance to any movement which had as its object the overthrow of the Kruger régime, and the concession of representative government to the entire white population. But he had no designs against the independence of the Republic, nor did he believe that more than the display of force would be necessary to achieve his objects. Unhappily, Jameson had suggested the employ-

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ment of an armed force recruited from the territories of the Chartered Company. The direction of affairs passed out of Rhodes's hands, and, whilst Jameson assembled his troopers at Mafeking, the uitlanders were conspiring to seize Johannesburg, and gain possession of the arsenal at Pretoria. But the leaders failed to take the rank and file into their confidence. Many were lukewarm in their support of the conspiracy ; and at the critical moment hesitated to sanction an appeal to arms. Rhodes was informed that the proposed rising had been indefinitely postponed. Jameson, however, believed that the uitlanders would take courage on the first movement of his troopers. Despite lack of military experience, his spectacular successes in Matabeleland filled him with confidence, and he underrated the fighting abilities of the Dutch burghers. Unhappily Rhodes's urgent telegram ordering him not to move across the republican frontier was unaccountably delayed. In these circumstances, Jameson decided to start for Johannesburg (29 December, 1895). The progress of his small force was accurately reported at Pretoria, and at Doornkop, Jameson and his men found themselves

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without shelter from the encircling Krupp guns. On January 1, his entire force surrendered to Cronje. Meanwhile, the uitlander leaders had done what they could at Johannesburg ; but arms were scarce, and the city could not be held against the entire forces of the Republic. Moreover, the High Commissioner's Proclamation ordering British subjects to abstain from assisting Jameson discouraged many. Under the circumstances, Kruger could afford to be generous. He handed over Jameson and his men for trial in England, whilst the leaders of the National Union were eventually liberated on the payment of heavy fines.

The whole conspiracy was foolish and inexcusable. It is true that the grievances of the uitlanders were substantial, and the prospects of their removal remote. The remonstrances of the British Government had been no more effective than the petitions of the immigrants themselves. But Rhodes had been guilty of subsidizing an armed insurrection against a technically friendly state. The Raid irreparably damaged his prestige, and brought ruin to his great plan of a South African federation resting upon the harmonious co-operation

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of British and Dutch. Moreover, though Jameson's escapade had been immediately condemned by the Imperial Government, British influence in all parts of the sub-Continent had been gravely injured. Suspicion of British policy flamed out with redoubled strength, not only in the Republics, but also in the Dutch-speaking areas of the Cape Colony. Rhodes had forfeited the support and esteem of his old colleagues, Hofmeyr and John X. Merriman, and in January (1896) his resignation was accepted. He had still six more years of life, which he devoted to the affairs of the Chartered Company and the pacification of Matabeleland. His return to parliamentary life in 1898 was a great personal triumph. He still believed that the prosperity of South Africa was dependent upon the attainment of some measure of federal union, and that the differences between British and Dutch would soon pass away. His happiest days were spent at Groote Schuur where Rhodes rebuilt, in the old Cape domestic architecture, the house which had been burned down in 1896. The new Groote Schuur, with its white-plastered gables and massive teak doors, looks out across the broad rollers of False Bay

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towards the distant outline of the Hottentots Holland range.

In the Transvaal, Kruger in no degree modified his harsh policy towards the uitlanders. Before the Raid, many good Afrikaners in the two Republics would have welcomed a change of régime at Pretoria. Jameson's ill-starred adventure restored the failing prestige of the old President, whose contention that the uitlander movement had been directed against the independence of the Republic now received apparent justification. The Liberal Party in the Volksraad accordingly lost ground, whilst the policy which Kruger represented received a new lease of life. The Aliens Immigration Act, 1896, went so far as to contravene Article VIII of the London Convention, which had guaranteed freedom of entry to British subjects. In 1898 Kruger was re-elected for a further term of office. The uitlanders now formed a majority of the Rand population, and contributed three-fourths of the state's revenue. Their grievances had become greatly aggravated since the Raid, and they were still debarred from any genuine participation in the privileges of citizenship.

Meanwhile (1897) Sir Alfred Milner had

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reached South Africa as High Commissioner, with instructions to secure reasonable reforms from the Transvaal Government. Though an Imperialist, Milner was determined to leave no avenue of peace unexplored. He detested the idea of war, and he accepted the judgment of Sir Michael Hicks-Beach that impatience had been at the root of British difficulties in South Africa. He was far from desiring to impose British ideas upon a reluctant people, and he could appreciate the sincerity of Kruger's resolve to maintain the integrity of the Republican polity. Though he believed that Kruger stood for a policy of Dutch hegemony in South Africa, he made it his purpose to treat with the Transvaal as a friendly neighbour, and to persuade its President to do justice to the uitlanders, without undue pressure from Great Britain.

Kruger unhappily had been alarmed by the Raid. He had no intention of giving way, and he used the long dreary months of negotiation to accumulate munitions of war. Along the Rand, the stiffening of the press laws, and the prohibition of public meetings, revived the uitlander agitation and provoked the petition to the

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Queen (January 1899) for protection and redress. In reply, Chamberlain proposed a conference. On the invitation of President Steyn, the Conference met at Bloemfontein in June. Milner believed that the only permanent remedy lay in the grant to the uitlanders of a fair measure of representation in the Government. He therefore stood out for the immediate concession of the franchise, on the basis of a five years' residence. This Kruger would not grant. His standpoint was intelligible, and he was probably supported in it by the majority of his burghers. He was determined that the Dutch-speaking inhabitants should not be swamped by new-comers who cared nothing for the ideal of an Afrikaner republic. The Conference therefore ended in deadlock. War was now probably unavoidable. The Free State had intimated its intention to throw in its lot with the sister Republic, and the six months of waiting which followed were devoted by both states to military preparations. Their example could not be followed by Great Britain, for fear that the despatch of troops would be interpreted as a provocation. Milner continued his efforts to avoid hostilities, and the recently-published

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Milner Papers (1931) reveal his incredible patience and the sincerity of his endeavours for peace. But the Republics had drafted their ultimatum on September 27. It was presented to the British Agent at Pretoria on October 9. In peremptory tones, Kruger demanded the immediate withdrawal of British troops. Three days later, republican armies invaded the Cape Colony and Natal.

Kruger's ultimatum closed the ranks of the British people at home and overseas, converting the vast majority of those who had refused to credit the hostile intentions of the northern Republic. The emergency revealed the strength of Imperial sentiment, both in the United Kingdom and in the oversea Dominions, but it found the War Office unprepared. In the opening campaigns, the Republicans enjoyed an immense advantage. The British troops were few in number, and, in the northern parts of the Cape Colony, they were obliged to operate in an unfriendly country. The Republicans were fighting on interior lines. They could place over forty thousand men in the field, well equipped with magazine rifles and field guns. Accurate marksmanship, together with the extreme

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mobility of their irregular columns, made them the most formidable enemy, in their own country, which Britain had met in her colonial warfare. To resist them, the main British forces had been concentrated in Natal, under Sir George White. General Joubert was in chief command of the forces of the Transvaal. Joubert's plan was to overrun the "garden colony," and take possession of the port of Durban. The conception was sound. Troops were on their way from England, but, until they arrived, the British in Natal were hopelessly outnumbered, whilst their artillery was outclassed by the Krupp and Creusot guns which Kruger had been accumulating since the Jameson Raid. A big republican success in Natal was calculated to encourage foreign intervention and bring about an insurrection in the Cape Colony. The Transvaal's commandos were accordingly massed for the invasion of Natal through Laings Nek; and the original line of battle was formed in the valleys which lay south of Majuba. Here Joubert pressed back White's columns, and compelled the evacuation of Newcastle. Fortunately for Natal, the veteran commandant was a cautious strategist. His leisurely

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advance gave White time to organize the defence of Ladysmith. Here the republican offensive was brought to a standstill.

Meanwhile, in the west, Kimberley had been encircled a few hours after the arrival of Cecil Rhodes. Farther north, a small British force was penned within Mafeking. Both towns were too strongly held to be in serious danger of assault from the enveloping commandos, but military and civilians were confronted by a real menace of famine and disease. In the Cape Midlands, the position was more serious, for the Free State forces had crossed the Orange River, and entered a land where Afrikaner sympathies were openly manifested. Within a few weeks of the outbreak of war, the important railway junctions of Naauwpoort and Stormberg were in their hands. Still the British forces were in no position to take the offensive. The arrival of the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Redvers Buller, with reinforcements, did much to restore confidence in the British cause, but the worst was yet to come. Scientific entrenchments, protected by barbed wire, enabled Cronje to throw back Methuen with severe loss at Magersfontein, and thus to bring to a standstill a promising movement

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for the relief of Kimberley. Farther south, Gatacre was surprised and defeated at Stormberg. In Natal, Buller fared no better. His artillery was markedly inferior to that of his opponents, yet he ventured on a frontal attack against a strongly-entrenched enemy. His losses exceeded a thousand, and he failed to force a crossing of the Tugela. It was the "black week" (December 1899) for British military prestige.

These setbacks produced a remarkable rally of volunteers from all parts of the Empire. Troops began to pour into Cape Town and Durban, whilst Lord Roberts was appointed to the supreme command, with Kitchener as his Chief-of-Staff. Roberts proposed an advance in force upon the Free State, whilst the bulk of the Transvaal burghers were held before Ladysmith. By February 11, he was ready to take the offensive. Whilst French, with the cavalry, broke through Cronje's outposts to relieve Kimberley, Roberts and Kitchener invested the main Free State army at Paardeberg, and compelled its surrender. Next day, Ladysmith was relieved through the dogged persistence of Buller and his men. It had sustained a

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four months' siege, during which civilians and military had endured hardships with the utmost gallantry. The war henceforth could have only one ending. Bloemfontein was occupied on March 13 and Pretoria less than three months later. For some months, republican armies continued to harass the communications of the British forces. By November, the British were in occupation of all the towns, and both Republics had been annexed.

Believing that all that remained was to round up scattered detachments, Roberts returned to England, leaving Kitchener in chief command. In reality the most stubborn phase of the war had still to come. Though defeated in the field, the burgher forces were capable of organizing guerrilla warfare and maintaining the struggle for another eighteen months. These tactics, pursued as they were with the greatest skill and gallantry, nevertheless inflicted severe suffering on the countryside. Only by an elaborate system of block-houses, and by establishing a cordon, through which Botha, de Wet and de la Rey could not break, did Kitchener finally succeed in wearing down the opposition of the wandering commandos. Not until

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May 31, 1902, were the republican leaders prepared to accept the British terms. At Vereeniging, they agreed to recognize King Edward VII as their lawful sovereign. Representative institutions, were, however, to be introduced into both Republics "as soon as circumstances permit"; whilst the use of the Dutch language was to be allowed in courts of law, and in the public schools. The British promise to place £3,000,000 at the disposal of commissioners for the purpose of restoring burghers to their farms, and supplying them with stock and implements, was an act of unprecedented liberality. The repatriation of Dutch farmers, upon which the Imperial Government eventually spent ten million pounds, contributed to heal the inevitable bitterness which the final stages of the war had accentuated.

It fell to Milner to guide and control the work of reconstruction of the political and economic life of South Africa. His main task was to reconcile Dutch and British, and lay the foundations of a united South Africa. Despite the exacerbation of feeling which the war had left behind, there was now more hope of achieving spontaneous co-operation. Racial antipathy, in

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the Transvaal, was largely removed when equal political rights were established for both white races. Moreover, the war brought the whole of South Africa under British sovereignty. Within five years of its conclusion, full responsible government had been conferred on the Transvaal and Orange River Colony. This wise and generous measure did much to conciliate the Dutch-speaking population, and to prepare the way for national union. For all four communities now enjoyed the fullest degree of self-government, and could negotiate with one another on equal terms. Nor were there any signs, in the former Republics, of a revival of the policy of racial exclusiveness. Almost from the first, the four Colonies made use of their autonomy to concert measures for the common advantage of South Africa.

Meanwhile (1905), Milner had retired from the High Commissionership. He had been largely responsible for the economic rehabilitation of the country in a period of commercial depression. His first task had been to repatriate the uitlanders and get the mines in full working order. To surmount the difficulty of recruiting labour, Milner reluctantly consented to recom-

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mend the Imperial Government to sanction the importation of Chinese coolies. Their introduction threatened still further to complicate the acute racial problems of South Africa; but the restoration of normal economic life and the success of Milner's plan to build up efficient administrations in the two northern states was dependent entirely on the expansion of the gold mining industry. Eventually the Chinese were repatriated. They had increased the output of gold and provided the funds needed for administrative purposes; but, had they been permitted to make the Transvaal their permanent home, a new and dangerous problem must have been added to those which already confronted South African statesmen.

Milner's successor, Lord Selborne, was a man of conspicuous good sense and transparent sincerity. As a practical farmer, it was doubtless easier for him, than for his predecessor, to win the confidence of the Dutch-speaking population. Selborne's great work for South Africa was his Memorandum, or *Review of the Present Mutual Relations of the British South African Colonies* (1907), a state paper comparable in importance with the more

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famous Durham Report. In this work, Selborne pointed out that South Africa could not be strictly self-governing, save as a single community. So long as the separate Governments of the four Colonies were permitted to pursue their own policies on matters of common interest, such as railway rates, customs duties and Asiatic immigration, the ultimate decision must lie with the Imperial Parliament. Moreover, a central Government could act more energetically than a number of comparatively small communities. Selborne dealt exhaustively with the economic arguments in favour of union, especially the necessity for equalizing taxation and customs rates, and the need for a single railway administration. These arguments were felt to be more potent after the breakdown of the Pretoria Conference (May 1908), which had met to negotiate a new customs tariff and railway agreement. The delegates, though they failed to agree upon these matters, resolved unanimously in favour of holding a National Convention to promote closer union.

The ground had been well prepared. Federation, or union, had been discussed in all four legislatures ; and, in the Cape

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Colony, it had been formally adopted by the Progressive Ministry of Dr. Jameson, one-time leader of the 1895 Raid. Its political opponents, the Bond Party, which took office in February 1908, under the leadership of John X. Merriman, were scarcely less enthusiastic. In all parts of South Africa, Closer Union Societies had been formed to promote the cause. There was a widespread conviction that separate institutions in the various Colonies were retarding national expansion.

The Convention met at Durban on October 12, 1908. It was then found that the delegates of the two northern states, notably General Botha and ex-President Steyn, were fervent advocates of union. The representatives of Natal voted solidly for federation, but they preferred union to complete isolation which the breakdown of the Convention would have involved. Outside Natal, opinion set in strongly in favour of a unitary form of government. South Africa was a single geographical and economic unit, and unification would involve an immense simplification of the machinery of government. The delegates accordingly decided, by a substantial majority, to make the central Parliament

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supreme, whilst establishing provinces with subordinate powers of legislation and administration. There were other vital points upon which early agreement was essential. The ready acceptance of General Hertzog's resolution, providing for the complete equality of English and Dutch, as the official languages of South Africa, did much to remove latent feelings of distrust and suspicion, and helped the delegates to reach agreement on the still more dangerous issue of the native franchise. The former Republics would never have entered a Union which bestowed the franchise on native peoples. On the other hand, the Cape was no less anxious to retain a distinctive feature of its whole native policy. Eventually a compromise was reached. It was agreed that no one in the Province of the Cape of Good Hope should be disqualified for the franchise by reason of his race or colour only. Not until both Houses of Parliament should so decide by a two-thirds majority could this guarantee be withdrawn.

The Convention framed a draft constitution, which was accepted with some modifications by the Parliaments of the four

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Colonies. The suggested amendments were discussed at a further meeting at Bloemfontein. As finally approved, the constitution was submitted to a referendum in Natal, and accepted by an unexpectedly large majority. In the other Colonies, it received parliamentary sanction. It only remained to embody the constitution in a Bill for submission to the Imperial Parliament. On September 20, 1909, the South Africa Act received the Royal assent.

The provisions of the new constitution need not be described in detail. The most distinctive feature is the nature of the provincial system. In each of the former Colonies a Provincial Council was erected with power to issue ordinances on specified subjects. These Councils control local institutions, including elementary and secondary education, and they may raise money by direct taxation. Nevertheless, they are subject in every respect to the control of the Union Government. The South Africa Act established the absolute supremacy of the central Parliament. This is safeguarded in two ways. Provincial ordinances could not become operative without the sanction of the Union Government; and Provincial Councils

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were to have no means of coercing the Provincial Executives. This is a remarkable feature of the Union constitution. Whereas the central machinery of government functions in accordance with the principle of parliamentary responsibility, this system is entirely absent in the Provinces. There is no authority which can enforce the resignation of the Provincial Executive. At its head is the Administrator, an officer appointed by the Union Government. To act with him as an Executive Committee, four members are elected from the Provincial Council by proportional representation. Once elected, they remain in office until the close of the Council's three year term. The relation of the Administrator to the Provincial Council is remarkable, for he is both Prime Minister and Governor-General. As Chairman of the Executive, he directs the administration of the Province and may explain and defend his policy in the Council, in much the same way as the Union Premier acts towards the House of Assembly. On the other hand, the Executive Council is not a cabinet. It has no party homogeneity, and consequently no collective responsibility. Its

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Chairman is really external to the Council, and it is intended that he should represent the paramount interests of the Union.

This system is strangely compounded of British parliamentary practice, and of precedents derived from the United States of America and from Switzerland. Constitutional difficulties have been acute. The Executive Council, cannot, by threat of resignation, enforce the adoption of a policy on which it may be unanimously agreed. The difficulty is increased where the elected members of the Executive are equally divided in respect of party allegiance ; for if the Administrator has been a party politician, he may be suspected of acting as such when he gives his casting vote. The inability of Council and Executive to reach agreement on the imposition of taxation has, on more than one occasion, threatened to bring the entire machinery of provincial government to a standstill.

Though unmistakably unitary in character, the constitution makes some concessions to the principle of federalism. The powers of government are concentrated in the Union Parliament, but that Parliament is constituted with some re-

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spect for federal notions. Each Province is given equal representation on the Senate, and these members were chosen, in the first place, by the four colonial Parliaments. Nor were seats in the Assembly allocated strictly in proportion to the European population of each of the Provinces. The two smaller units, Natal and the Orange Free State (the old name now being revived) received for ten years a larger representation than they were entitled to, on a basis of population. Moreover, the franchise laws were to remain unchanged until Parliament should have devised a uniform franchise for the Union. Except that the vote has been conceded to European women, this has not yet been done.

As regards the choice of a capital, the principle of compromise was again followed. Whilst Cape Town was selected as the legislative capital, Pretoria was to be the seat of government. At Bloemfontein the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court was located. The arrangement has been expensive, and is probably inconsistent with the fullest measure of efficiency, but no other solution could have commanded general acceptance.

The framers of the constitution had

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obviously sacrificed stability and logical consistency, in order to secure general agreement. It was frankly left to the future to provide a solution of many of the political and constitutional problems. The constitution is not particularly democratic, for the vast majority of the large native population are left without political rights, whilst women did not vote in parliamentary elections until 1932. But the recognition of complete equality, as between British and Dutch, was a great achievement which made possible the development of a genuine spirit of South African nationality, at least among the European population of the Union.

CHAPTER VII

THE UNION TO-DAY

THE establishment of a united South Africa was a signal triumph for the ideals of racial conciliation and political compromise, but it did not amount to a real national union, even so far as the European population alone was concerned. The eight years which had elapsed since the conclusion of the South African War were insufficient to remove, or substantially to mitigate, the bitter memories of the protracted struggle. More was required than the mere acceptance of the principle of equality between Dutch and British, if an organic national unity was to emerge. Serious obstacles impeded the harmonious co-operation of the two white races. The war had placed the older population in a position of decided inferiority. Thanks to the wisdom and magnanimity of Liberal statesmen in Great Britain, the path had been made easy for

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the advent of a predominantly Dutch Government, representing a Dutch majority among the electorate. Nevertheless, the Dutch-speaking section of the nation remained at a disadvantage in many ways. There was substantial inequality in the public service, where British officials were entrenched in most of the higher posts. Bilingualism was very far from being realized. Only in the Free State did the Dutch language enjoy complete equality with English as a medium for school instruction.

The Conventions had laid the foundations of national unity, but unforeseen obstacles delayed the completion of the task of racial conciliation. Even now there is lacking a common sentiment of nationhood. The Union to-day is a self-governing state, with a unitary constitution, but it is not yet an organic national community.

It fell to General Botha, as first Prime Minister of the Union, to give practical effect to the principle of equal partnership, whilst keeping in the forefront the ideal of reconciliation. For this task, he was in many ways ideally fitted. His supreme tact and charm of personality

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were the cement which held together the original South African Party, despite the conflicting ideals of many of its component groups. Botha believed that the attainment of a free South African Dominion had eliminated discord, failing to appreciate the strength of the forces which stood in the way of the attainment of a real unity of the spirit. For, in the Transvaal and still more in the Free State, there survived a strong sentiment of Afrikaner nationality. Botha, with his broad programme of conciliation, took insufficient account of existing divergencies of tradition and inheritance. Trustful that self-government would put an end to controversy and bitterness, he had little sympathy for any movement which sought to keep alive a distinctive Afrikaner culture.

The year 1912 witnessed the first break in the unity of Botha's following, and gave birth to Nationalism, as a political programme. The *Orangia Unie*, the party which Steyn and Hertzog had formed in the self-governing Orange River Colony, had been nominally incorporated among the adherents of the Ministry. But Afrikaner sentiment in the re-named Free State found cause for offence in the close

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relations which existed between the Union and the Imperial Government. Hertzog himself repudiated imperialism, save in so far as it benefited South Africa. In December he was forced to retire from the Cabinet. His association with the leaders of the cultural movement, the chief aim of which was to make Afrikaans a literary language and secure its absolute equality alongside of English, brought into existence a Nationalist Opposition, which soon came to be the most formidable rival to Botha's South African Party.

The Nationalist Party is recruited almost exclusively from the rural areas of South Africa, which outside Natal and the eastern parts of the Cape Province are solidly Afrikaans-speaking. In recent years, it has grown at the expense of the South African Party, which has gradually ceased to be a predominantly Dutch party and now finds its chief support in English-speaking areas. The division has been deepened by the Great War. Botha's policy, ably seconded by General Smuts, of active association with Great Britain and her allies, aroused the hostility of Beyers, de Wet and other leaders in the former Republics. The hope of regaining

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their lost independence was the chief motive of those who ventured upon the armed rebellion of October 1914. The rising, which was quickly suppressed, renewed bitter memories on both sides and kept prominent the reality of division. Moreover, the war immensely stimulated national sentiment throughout the world. The Afrikaans-speaking people became more and more conscious of separate nationality ; and this rising tide of Afrikaner sentiment has quite definitely set back the achievement of national unity.

Before the close of the Great War, Nationalists had begun a republican agitation, which was not silenced by Botha's achievement of constitutional independence for South Africa, together with separate membership of the League of Nations. Botha's death in 1919 was an irreparable loss. His uniform kindness and gift of sympathy made him the ideal counsellor for a divided nation. The magnificent intellect of his successor, General Smuts, could scarcely compensate for lack of imaginative insight. Botha had contact with the thoughts and emotions of his people. Smuts seemed to lack warmth of nature, and could not rally the support

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of the *platteland*. A statesman of uncommon width of vision, and a scientist and philosopher of world-wide distinction, the Union's new Premier yet failed to secure a paramount influence over his own people. For Smuts turned first to the Nationalists, and, only after the latter had refused to be content with anything short of complete separation from the British Empire, did he make reluctant overtures to the wholly English-speaking Unionist Party. The absorption of the Unionists enabled Smuts to win a substantial victory at the elections of 1921, but not to recover the ground which his Party had lost to the Nationalists in the country districts. His position was one of much difficulty, for the alliance with the Unionists provoked the persistent hostility of the Labour Party, whilst the Government's policy of a gradual development of a national status within the Empire did nothing to meet the essential demands of the Nationalists. Smuts contended that the Union had no legal right to secede, and that a bill to sever connection with the British Empire could not constitutionally receive the Royal assent. His opponents replied by making secession an issue at elections.

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Meanwhile, the Prime Minister, by his handling of the industrial dispute on the Rand (1922), had incurred the enmity of organized labour in the great towns. The combined forces of Nationalism and of Labour brought about the fall of the Ministry in 1924, and the Nationalist Party took office for the first time, under General Hertzog, in association with Labour.

Since 1924, the republicanism of General Hertzog's Party has undergone considerable modification. Not until 1929 was the Party able to command a clear majority over others. Whilst in opposition, its spokesmen had demanded nothing less than complete separation from the British Empire. The agreement with Labour, however, could only be secured on condition that republicanism was dropped at least for the life of the newly-elected Parliament. In the past, General Hertzog had made constant appeals to a purely Afrikaner national sentiment. He now began to realize the strength of the opposition to secession. In 1925 he declared that the Union did not wish to separate from the Empire. Since that date, his Ministry have explored the possibility of

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securing the status of sovereign independence for the Union within the framework of the Imperial Commonwealth. The Nationalist Party to-day is not a republican party. It has accepted co-operation with the other members of the Commonwealth, and, though some of its extremist followers insist on retaining republicanism as an expression of their political faith, the issue has been removed from the Party's official programme.

Will secession be brought back into the political foreground? General Hertzog's contention has been all along that South Africa could not rest content until it had been placed on a footing of absolute equality with Great Britain. This demand was conceded readily and unanimously at the Imperial Conference of 1926, when the Dominions were recognized as equal in status with the United Kingdom and possessing sovereign independence. The old theory of subordination was thus definitely discarded. This declaration of the status of the Dominions was at once accepted by General Hertzog and his colleagues. Speaking at Pretoria, after his return from the Conference, the South African Premier declared that "in no

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other manner our national freedom can enjoy greater authority and guarantee than within the British Empire on the basis on which it exists to-day." The right of secession is regarded by the Nationalist Government as implicit in the definition of Dominion status. On this point there is still an important divergence of opinion between the Nationalists and the supporters of General Smuts. The latter contend that the acceptance of a common allegiance precludes a single Dominion from seeking to dissolve its allegiance by a unilateral act. For the present, however, the matter seems to be largely academic. At the 1930 Conference, General Herzog was reassured as to the complete freedom of the Union, including presumably its right to leave the Commonwealth should it so desire. The Statute of Westminster 1931, implementing the report of the Conference on the Operation of Dominion Legislation, has apparently closed the issue. South Africa now possesses sovereign independence, and General Herzog has not been slow to lay emphasis on the value of Commonwealth co-operation.

Nevertheless, not all those who be-

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long to the Nationalist Party have been genuinely converted from the republican ideal. At present, there is a republican wing, which is for the moment content to pursue its ideals outside the political arena. Its activities have been largely concerned with the training of the Afrikaner youth. In order to promote a distinctively Afrikaner outlook among the Dutch-speaking boys, it has, for instance, organized a separate *Voortrekker* movement over against the official Boy Scouts, which it regards as an instrument of British propaganda. This separatist standpoint must delay the attainment of a true South African spirit.

General Hertzog, and notably among his colleagues Mr. N. C. Havenga, the Minister of Finance, have gone far in expressing disapproval of this new republican development; and, so long as they remain in authority, the issue is unlikely to become a matter of practical politics. In two directions, indeed, the Government has awakened the distrust of the English-speaking population. It has deliberately followed a policy of replacing English civil servants by Dutch, and it has made an attack on the Union Jack. In both cases,

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however, the action of the Government is entitled to a certain measure of justification. The European community, as a whole, is not yet bilingual. Geographical factors have made effective bilingualism difficult. In many parts of the Union the citizen has insufficient opportunity to use the other official language in conversation. But there is much to be said for the proposition that bilingualism in the public service is essential. The policy of the Government has induced English-speaking citizens to learn Afrikaans, and this, in the long run, must make for a broader national unity.

On the flag issue, the Government was merely following the lead of other Dominions in seeking to provide a national flag for the Union. Unfortunately, its original demand that the Union Jack should not appear in the design was a departure from Dominion precedents, and was calculated to revive racial animosities. Though the Union Jack was doubtless a symbol of conquest to many in the former Republics, it represented for the English-speaking population of the Union their cherished traditions. Eventually, a compromise was reached. The Jack appears, on a

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small scale, in the centrepiece of the new flag, which is a tricolour of transverse stripes of orange, white and blue.

To-day the political position appears to have reached a state of flux. There are clear signs of disintegration within both the main parties. Now that General Hertzog has so fully accepted the status of the Union, as a voluntary member of the British Commonwealth, the most troublesome source of political division has been removed. It is mainly the memory of strife which now keeps apart the South African and Nationalist parties, and this memory is most deeply retained by the respective leaders. There is a growing feeling that the retirement of the two leaders, whose great services to their country no fair man will hesitate to acknowledge, will be followed by a new orientation of the political system. The Nationalist Party will probably lose its republican wing. Another section, the personal followers of Dr. W. P. Steenkamp, a clergyman of the Dutch Reformed Church, has already broken away, on the ground that the Government has not done enough for the poor man, and especially for the poor farmer. To balance these

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losses, the Nationalists may find support in English-speaking areas. The future alignment of parties in the Union will probably be based on economic issues and on conceptions of native policy. Here there is much to draw together moderate Nationalists and South African Party men. On the whole, public opinion in English-speaking Natal is in sympathy with the Nationalist attitude towards the political and economic future of the native, and hostile to what is called the "negrophilism" of the Cape Province. It is noteworthy that recent riots in Durban have induced Natal members of Parliament to support part of the Government's programme of legislation, particularly its Riotous Assemblies Bill, introduced in 1930. At the same time, the development of industries in Natal has promoted economic nationalism in that province, and brought it into line with the Nationalist ideal of economic self-sufficiency. Under these circumstances, Natal has been inclined to respond favourably to the Prime Minister's appeal for national unity. Personal differences are still an obstacle, but a re-alignment of parties in the near future must be regarded as very probable.

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Much will depend upon the attitude of the present Minister of Finance, for Mr. N. C. Havenga is clearly the man of the future in South Africa. No South African statesman has made fewer appeals to past controversies, or pleaded more sincerely for mutual appreciation and understanding. To a large degree he may be said to enjoy the confidence of all but the extremists among both white races. The Ottawa Conference 1932 added greatly to his personal prestige. Since the advent to power of the Nationalists, the policy of the Union Government has been to substitute reciprocal trade arrangements for the older plan of an all-round preference on Empire goods. At Ottawa, Mr. Havenga showed that he was anxious to give the fullest consideration to proposals for extending inter-Imperial trade. His policy had much in common with that of the Ministers of the United Kingdom. Both Governments were compelled to safeguard over-sea markets outside the Empire. But, on a basis of mutual advantage, Mr. Havenga showed that he was quite prepared to offer increased preference to Britain. In view of the strength of the feeling among a considerable section of the Government's

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supporters against any increase in the economic dependence of the Union on the British Empire, his attitude was doubly welcome. The Union's tariff is now definitely on a protective basis, and Nationalist Party organs have urged that preference to Great Britain could not be extended without injuring South African producers. In recent years, the Government has been inclined to underrate the importance of the British market and to pay closer attention to the development of continental markets. It has negotiated a commercial treaty with Germany (1928), which went so far as to promise that Germany should share in any extension of the Imperial preference. This treaty the Union Government was prepared to denounce, in the event of agreement at Ottawa. But the Union insisted on a substantial *quid pro quo*. The greater part of the Union's exports to Great Britain consist of gold and of raw materials, such as wool, on which the British Government could not be expected to impose duties, in order to grant preferential treatment to South Africa. On the other hand, the Union was unlikely to modify its policy of protecting its own nascent industries.

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Nevertheless, a measure of agreement was found to be possible. South Africa is not yet a highly industrialized country. In fact, there are formidable obstacles to the growth of manufacturing industries. The home market is exceedingly small, whilst the high level of wages paid to European workers makes it difficult for the Union manufacturer to dispose of his output in competition with the products of low-wage countries. It is true that South Africa has an abundant supply of cheap coloured labour, but its low productivity hampers development. Industrial expansion has accordingly been dependent on tariff protection, and many kinds of imported articles are not likely to be manufactured in the Union for many years to come. Increased preferences to Britain on such commodities would mean no more than a slight sacrifice of customs revenue. In return, Mr. Havenga asked for preferential treatment in the British market for South African fruit, butter, eggs and chilled beef.

During the parliamentary sessions of 1932, the issue of the gold standard dominated the political arena. The Government has adhered steadily to its original

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contention that to abandon gold, when under no sort of compulsion to do so, would be an act of dishonesty amounting to partial repudiation of its obligations. South Africa has so far been able to maintain a favourable balance of trade. The decline in value of its exports, other than gold, has been offset by heavy reductions in imports. But the large remittances to London have produced a growing scarcity of capital and credit, and only the continued prosperity of the gold-mining industry has made it possible for the Union to carry on. The Government has done what it could to ease the position for the primary producer. In two directions, maintenance of the gold standard has brought relief to the Exchequer. It has involved a considerable saving in the interest charges on the Union's external debt ; and it has made it possible to impose additional taxation on imports from countries which have left gold, without bringing about a rise in prices to the consumer. The Government has utilized these sources of revenue to subsidize the exporter of foodstuffs and other primary products, thus saving from ruin a considerable section of the Union's export

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trade. How long it can continue to do so on the same basis is uncertain. The export bounties have been very costly, and it seems improbable that the exporter will be able to dispense with them in the near future. Sooner or later, the problem will arise of obtaining further oversea loans. So long as sterling remains depreciated, it will be difficult to raise loans in London. On the other hand, the Union Government has not unnaturally hesitated to adopt the standard of another country, over whose monetary policy it could exercise no effective control. Meanwhile, financial depression has had its normal reaction in a growing feeling of dissatisfaction with the Government, and with the working of the party system.

Discontent has been most formidable in Natal. To some extent, the malaise in this predominantly English-speaking Province is attributable to disappointment at the working of the constitutional machine. Natal has always regarded the Provincial Councils and the independent Senate as the bulwarks of local liberties. It accepted a unitary form of government with manifest reluctance, and in reliance on the federal elements which had been

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introduced into the constitution. These elements, however, have been progressively undermined. The Government has proposed abolition of the Provincial Councils, and it has used its control over a well-disciplined parliamentary majority to increase the powers of the Executive. Parliamentary government is a misnomer, for the Union is, in fact, under strict bureaucratic control. Even supervision of expenditure has largely slipped out of the hands of the Legislature. Parliament does not fully discuss the reports of the Committee on Public Accounts, whilst Ministers have been allowed to transfer sums, voted for specific departmental requirements, from one section to another. Government is largely by regulations, framed in accordance with insufficiently detailed Acts. This tendency towards bureaucracy and centralization has caused a revival of the federation issue in Natal. There can be no doubt that the vast majority of Natalians would enthusiastically welcome the elevation of their Provincial Council to be a state parliament in a federal South Africa, and strenuously resist any further restrictions of local liberty. So far, and despite the irritation

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of double taxation which has militated against the popularity of Provincial Councils in the other Provinces, the "Devolution Movement" has been able to count on a generous measure of local support. The move to abolish the Councils had been interpreted as an attack on the identity of Natal, as a British community within a Union which had made considerable advances towards the ideal of an independent Afrikaner republic. Moreover, outside the towns there are no other organs of local government. These considerations dictated an attitude of vigorous opposition to centralization. But there were other reasons for misgiving and concern. The Union Government had begun to enforce bilingual qualifications even in purely English-speaking areas. There was a genuine, though probably erroneous, impression that only persons with strong Afrikaner sympathies would receive promotion. Moreover, Natal is still predominantly British in descent, and it has viewed with dismay the activities of the republican wing of the Nationalist Party. The flag controversy, followed as it was by the conclusion of the German treaty, kept alive racial distrust. Nevertheless,

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the majority of the inhabitants of Natal are conscious of their South African citizenship. Not more than a handful of her responsible politicians are prepared to countenance separation from the Union, even as a preliminary to federation. If sympathetically approached, the grievances of Natal are not likely to find expression in a serious movement of secession.

To-day, there are many South Africans who believe that the future of the Union lies in the North. The natural boundary of South Africa is the Zambezi River, and the immense mineral resources of the two Rhodesias will probably make these territories the chief wealth-producing areas of the future. The possibility of the incorporation of Southern Rhodesia in the Union had been considered from the earliest days of the movement towards union, and the territory was represented at the National Convention. Rhodes himself had regarded the settlement of the region between the Limpopo and the Zambezi as an expansion of the Cape Colony. But the Great War strengthened the dividing lines. The rebellion in the Union, the apparent reluctance of many in the ex-

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Republics to participate in the war, and the later manifestations of a desire for secession, alienated the large majority of English-speaking Rhodesians. In 1921 the Cave Commission disposed of the old controversy over the land and mineral rights of the British South Africa Company, and prepared the way for an advance in the political status of Rhodesia. At this point, General Smuts came forward with an offer of generous terms of incorporation in the Union. An energetic campaign followed to induce Rhodesians to join the Union. But the advocates of incorporation were unable to remove the misgivings engendered by republican agitation. The Rhodesians were anxious to work out their own destiny, in close association with the British Empire. Smuts's offer was rejected at a referendum. Accordingly, on September 1, 1923, the Colony was granted a constitution which established responsible government, subject to limitations relating to native affairs, railways and mineral rights. The Company, which had hitherto governed the territory, became no more than a commercial corporation, protected, however, in its enjoyment of proprietary rights over

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minerals and railways by special constitutional safeguards.

So far the constitution has worked fairly smoothly. Opinion has undoubtedly hardened against the policy of incorporation in the Union, for Rhodesia has appreciated its freedom from the racial and language controversies of its southern neighbour. The insistence on sovereign independence, the demand for a national flag which should not include the Union Jack, and the negotiation of the German treaty have contributed to widen the gap. In 1922 many voted against incorporation because they wished to have experience of responsible government, so that union could come later on terms of equality. To-day, the great majority of Rhodesians are invincibly opposed to any suggestion for submerging the individuality of their country within a South African Dominion.

Nevertheless, Rhodesia is linked to the Union by economic ties. It is a member of the Customs Union which also includes the British Protectorates of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland. Trade between the Union and Rhodesia has expanded very considerably in recent years. The greater part of the Rhodesian tobacco

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crop is sent to the Union, where it is blended with Union tobacco. Rhodesian cattle also finds a market in the Union. On the other hand, Rhodesia is an important market for the Union's manufacturing output. A certain measure of free trade between the two countries is therefore mutually advantageous, and it would be a disaster if anything like a prohibitive tariff were to be imposed by either Government. Unfortunately, both countries have adopted protective tariffs in the hope of encouraging secondary industries. The renewal of the Customs agreement in 1930 was accomplished only after protracted negotiations. More recently, the resolution of the Rhodesian Government to abandon gold and follow sterling has imposed a further obstacle to trade with the Union.

Southern Rhodesia lies across the highway which connects the Union with the British territories to the north of the Zambezi. Its refusal to link its fortunes with those of the Union effectively bars the way to administrative continuity with these northern lands. From the South African point of view this is regrettable, for the mineral wealth of Northern Rho-

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desia must ultimately lead to a great development in that area. The vast copper deposits of the Katanga district may even prove to be the Witwatersrand of future decades. South African capitalists and engineers are bound to play an important part in these developments. The northern territories are not unnaturally regarded as the economic hinterland of the Union, the future market for her manufactured products and the field for employment of her professional classes. At present the attitude of Southern Rhodesia is a barrier to political consolidation. Nevertheless, there are many who believe that the ultimate destiny of all the British territories in Africa as far north as Kenya Colony, is membership in some federated group, in which the Union will naturally be the predominant partner.

The Union, however, though the oldest and wealthiest centre of European civilization in the sub-Continent, has so far produced little that can be regarded as a permanent contribution towards the solution of problems of African administration. A federated African state under Union leadership would definitely mean a civilization on the basis of white supremacy,

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with the exploitation of African resources by a relatively small body of European immigrants. A solution along these lines would involve introducing into the northern territories the acute inter-racial difficulties of the Union. The danger of racial discrimination to the prejudice of the black man can only be avoided by frank recognition of the principle that in tropical Africa, where fertile land at high altitudes is not abundant, European settlement should be subordinate to native interests. This is not the view of prominent South African statesmen. According to General Smuts, white exploitation is most likely to foster native progress, owing to the efficiency of European methods of production. The experience of west Africa and of Uganda, however, goes far to negative the assumption that native production is necessarily wasteful and incompetent. It is difficult to resist the conclusion that ultimate economic and social stability must be sought along lines of policy and administration far removed from those which are followed in the present Union of South Africa.

The conquest of German South-West Africa by Union troops gave the Union

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a *locus standi* in the vast, though arid and undeveloped, territory on its north-western borders. South-West Africa is now held by mandate which provides for its administration as an integral part of the Union. In 1925 it was substantially incorporated in the provincial system. At an earlier date, its administration had incurred some criticism, in connection with the use of bombing planes to suppress an insignificant native rising. Recent years have witnessed a substantial measure of pacification among the tribes ; and, despite the poverty of the territory, there has been a considerable growth in the European population. Its manifest destiny is incorporation within the Union.

European critics have called attention to the illiberality of the present native policy of the Union. In the first place, there is the question of land reservation. There are approximately five million Bantu within the Union, as compared with less than two million Europeans. Approximately twenty per cent of the land is open to native occupation. It is estimated that the overcrowded locations support about two-fifths of the Bantu population. The promise of additional native areas which

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was made in 1913, as partial compensation for loss of the right to acquire land outside the reserves, in the three northern Provinces, has not been fulfilled. Large numbers of natives, probably as many as live in the reserves, earn a precarious subsistence as labour tenants on European farms. The rest have drifted into the towns to find unskilled employment in industry. Some have become a permanent part of the urban population. This competition of the native in unskilled and semi-skilled occupations has made the European apprehensive as to the future of his race. With the spread of education among the natives, there has naturally followed a claim to enjoy the privileges of citizenship, and particularly the right of entry into skilled employment. This is strenuously resisted by the white man. His ideal is the maintenance of a high standard of living for an increasing white population, which shall control at its own discretion the destinies of the Bantu peoples. The average white voter believes that the native should be allowed freedom of development only within his reserves ; and that, if he chooses to enter European areas, he should be subject to

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such restrictions as will debar him from competing successfully with the European worker. These notions have found expression in legislation. Whilst European workers are organized and protected, non-Europeans outside the Cape Province are excluded from membership of trade unions. The breach of a contract of service and the withholding of labour in order to secure higher wages are criminal offences in South Africa only when committed by natives. Apart from the mines, the only considerable avenues of native employment are domestic service and agriculture, and these occupations are excepted from the operation of such legislation as the Wage Act 1925, which gives protection to the wage-earner. The policy of the Government is indeed based avowedly on the formula of segregation, and on the denial of political and economic equality. Segregation, however, is a vague term. The natural segregation, which was based on fundamental divergencies in outlook and interests, has long since been broken down. The whole economic structure of South Africa now rests upon the foundation of unskilled Bantu labour. Though society is far from being homogeneous, European

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and Bantu are in large measure inter-dependent. Moreover, the determined opposition of the European community to any substantial extension of native land-ownership makes territorial segregation an impossibility. For, without an adequate endowment of land, the native must seek employment in European areas. This employment he cannot now find, without submitting to drastic restrictions on his freedom of action. Even in agriculture, the relatively congenial expedient of squatting is to be denied him in the Transvaal and Natal, for the new Service Contract Bill 1932, if passed into law, will oblige landlords to get rid of native squatters and to replace them by labour tenants. The penalties for breach of contract by native youths under the age of eighteen years are to include whipping by order of a magistrate. At the same time, no native in areas laid down will be able to leave his home, in search of domestic or agricultural employment, without an identification card.

Native legislation in recent years has tended to follow the lead of the North. The more liberal Cape policy has been largely discredited. A notable feature of

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the Cape system has been the grant of the parliamentary franchise. This is now in danger of abolition. In 1925 General Hertzog published far-reaching proposals of native policy, which included a comprehensive scheme of native representation. In place of the Cape native franchise, the natives of the Union were to receive a purely European representation in the Assembly. The Premier's original proposal was that the Union should be divided into seven native constituencies with a restricted franchise. Each constituency would return one member, who was to be a European and to have no power of voting on any matter declared by Government to be a question of confidence. These suggestions have since been modified in detail. But the principal feature, the entire abolition of the Cape franchise, involving the disfranchisement of some 16,000 Bantu voters, remains unamended. It is true that a second Bill proposes to establish a Native Council, which is to act in some ways as a Bantu parliament for the Union. But the franchise for this Council is to be determined by regulation, whilst its deliberative and legislative powers are to

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be closely restricted. A more liberal provision is made for the coloured (i.e. non-Bantu) population, which is ultimately to receive the vote on the same terms as Europeans. These arrangements, together with fresh proposals for the delimitation of areas within which natives may, in competition with Europeans, acquire land, are embodied in four Bills, which have not yet become law. It is a provision of the Union Constitution that no change can be made in the native franchise at the Cape without the consent of a two-thirds majority, at a joint session of the two parliamentary houses. In 1930 the Native Franchise Bill was referred to a Select Committee of both houses which has not yet reported. Meanwhile, the Government has bestowed the franchise on European women (1930), and, in the following year, on all European men, without application of the educational and property tests hitherto imposed in the Cape and Natal.

The problem of the electoral rights of the native is by no means susceptible to simple solution. The right of even so small a number as 16,000 Cape natives to vote at parliamentary elections on the same fran-

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chise as Europeans has compelled a certain number of members of the House of Assembly to take account of the needs of the black man. Rightly or wrongly, native opinion associates the more generous treatment of the Cape natives with the maintenance of the Cape system of an undifferentiated franchise. Since the withdrawal of this right would be regarded as an act of bad faith on the part of the white man, the arguments in favour of retention of the present system have special force. On the other hand, there is much to be said for General Hertzog's contention that the inevitable growth of a native electorate alongside the European involves the probability that sooner or later the European will be outvoted at the polls—an intolerable situation which may lead to reproduction in the Union of the deplorable conditions which obtain in the southern states of the American Union. This danger may be remote, but it is reasonable that steps should be taken in good time to guard against evils which can be clearly foreseen. The proposals of the present Government aim at conceding to natives in all four Provinces an alternative system of representation which is consistent with the

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maintenance of white supremacy. The system proposed could no doubt be made more liberal, and more congenial to native aspirations. But it at least has the substantial merit that it removes the fear of Bantu domination which has certainly operated to retard useful developments in native education and social welfare.

The present electoral roll of the Cape Province includes Indian as well as Bantu voters. The problem of the Indian is scarcely less difficult than that of the Bantu, in South Africa. True, his numbers are relatively small (less than 200,000). But, by reason of his industrial skill and intelligence, the Indian is a more formidable competitor of the European workman and trader. A large majority of the present Indian population have been born within the Union, and it is not unreasonable that they should claim fair treatment as co-citizens with Europeans. Nevertheless, Indians have been subject to severe restrictions, especially in the matter of land ownership and trading licences. Not until 1927 was friendly agreement reached between the Union and the Government of India, under which the latter consented to assist in the voluntary repat-

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riation of Indians, in return for a promise of increased grants for the education and social improvement of those who elected to retain their South African domicile. To-day, Indians are far from enjoying equality of citizenship with the white man ; but something has been done to raise the Asiatic standard of living and to combat the inherited prejudices which have militated against racial co-operation.

To-day South Africa is a land inhabited by at least three separate communities, European, Asiatic and Bantu. Every visitor is impressed by the economic and social barriers which keep apart black and white. The Coloured folk are also a distinct body, though in their case the legal and social disabilities are a less formidable obstacle to the development of a tolerably homogeneous community. In the twentieth century, there is a greater consciousness of diversity in race, colour and scale of civilization, among the peoples of South Africa than can be traced in the literature of an earlier age. There is, for example, a genuine appreciation of the heroic qualities of the Bantu, in the prose and poetry of the early nineteenth century, a willing admiration of the hardihood,

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loyalty and essential humility of the black man, with whom the colonist and frontiersman are content to mingle their fortunes. This spirit of sympathetic admiration was present in the work of Thomas Pringle (1789-1834) "the Father of South African poetry." Pringle had associated himself with the movement to emancipate the slaves, and his poetry reflected his love of freedom and sympathy with backward peoples. In "The Bechuana Boy" deep affection for South Africa and her sons of every colour is the inspiration of a poem, which reveals Pringle's powers of graphic description and sympathetic interpretation. The fascination of the South African landscape is the theme of many later poems by E. B. Watermeyer, Francis Carey Slater and Arthur Shearly Cripps. Among the younger generation are C. L. Leipoldt, J. F. E. Celliers and, less distinctively South African in sentiment, Roy Campbell. The recent work of South African poets, notably the lyrical poems in the Afrikaans language, has been stimulated by the growing consciousness of national unity and destiny.

In recent years, an Afrikaans literature, with a distinctively South African out-

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look, has emerged. Afrikaans gradually developed as a spoken language from the seventeenth-century dialects of Holland. Its grammatical differentiation from the parent language was promoted by the assimilation of numbers of Germans and of French Huguenots within the European community. Afrikaans, in essentially its present form, was the mother-tongue of the great majority of South African Dutchmen before the first British occupation of the Cape.

The movement to promote the use of Afrikaans as a written language dates from 1860, when L. H. Meurant deliberately chose Afrikaans as the medium for a political pamphlet intended for circulation on the *platteland*. Its enthusiastic reception encouraged the Rev. S. J. du Toit to found the first organization for advancing the use and study of Afrikaans, *Die Eerste Afrikaanse Taal Beweging* (1875). This body failed to persuade the Dutch Reformed Church to sanction the publication of the Bible in Afrikaans ; but it produced a large number of simply-worded pamphlets and maintained a newspaper, which served to educate the rural population in the correct use of written

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Afrikaans. Not until the twentieth century was work of real literary value produced. The publication of J. H. de Waal's historical novel, *Johannes van Wyk* (1906), opened up a new field, in which Leipoldt was to win distinction.

The annexation of the Republics, at the close of the South African War, was followed by a period of great activity in the promotion of Afrikaans. The national identity of the Afrikaner seemed to be imperilled. Afrikaans was regarded as the cherished heritage of the past. In 1914, the language began to replace Nederlands in the schools. It was accepted as an official language by the various denominations of the Dutch Reformed Church in the following decade. Its full recognition as the second official language of the Union dates from a parliamentary resolution of 1925.

To-day, there is a considerable body of Afrikaans literature, including work of outstanding merit in poetry, prose fiction, biography and dramatic literature. On the linguistic side, also, much work has been done. Under the auspices of the Suid Afrikaanse Akademie, the problems of the phonetics, syntax and orthography

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of Afrikaans have been authoritatively investigated. Afrikaans has now largely emerged from the formative stage, and attained a standard of uniformity in vocabulary and idiom.

During the latter half of the year 1932 economic conditions appreciably worsened. Despite the Cabinet's unswerving faith in the gold standard, public confidence in the ability of South Africa to weather the economic blizzard without depreciation of her currency steadily waned. In December, the solidarity of the Nationalist Party began to break up; and pressure was brought to bear upon Judge Tielman Roos, formerly leader of the Party in the Transvaal, to return to political life. Mr. Roos's resignation from the Appeal Court Bench, and his declaration in favour of devaluation and the formation of a coalition government led to a further flight from the South African pound, which compelled the Government to withdraw the convertibility into gold, on demand, of Reserve Bank notes. Before the close of the year, South Africa was virtually off the gold standard. Though General Hertzog and his colleagues remained in office, public opinion had not been slow to express itself

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in support of Mr. Roos as the one man who could save South Africa from economic ruin.

There are many who view with despondency the future of South Africa. It is clear that the Union has reached the point when the political and economic distinctions between European and non-European are beginning to break down. On the one hand, no less than one-tenth of the white population are now definitely unable to support themselves on the standard of living which Europeans have so far enjoyed in the Union. They belong to the so-called "poor white" class, and must now compete with natives for the low-paid unskilled jobs. At the same time, the natives have, for many years, been making advances in knowledge and in industrial capacity. A large and growing section of the Bantu population is urbanized, and there is a rising sense of racial solidarity. In the long run, these underpaid, but no longer uncivilized, workers will demand a measure of economic equality with the Europeans. They are unlikely long to tolerate a purely legislative restriction on their entry into skilled trades. As the gold mines become

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exhausted, this problem is certain to become more acute.

What prospect is there of a change of outlook on problems of native policy? Mr. Leonard Barnes, in his book *Caliban in Africa* (1930), takes a pessimistic view of the future. He argues that "natives are habitually maltreated in outrageous ways all over South Africa," and that Afrikaner prejudices on questions of colour are incapable of modification. It is his considered judgment that the Afrikaner is prepared to uphold the supremacy of his own particular type of white civilization in the Union, even at the cost of grave injustice to the native. This view takes insufficient account of the spread of culture and enlightenment in recent years. Among the rising generation, and particularly within the large body of secondary scholars and University students, there is far less colour prejudice to-day than existed at Union. The young South African is anxious to study Bantu problems. Native administration is a popular subject at the Universities. Study circles seek intimate contact with the black man in the towns. The native has been admitted to organizations which are parallel to the Boy Scout and Girl

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Guide Movements. These are indications that the social gulf between white and black is contracting and not widening.

It is also true that ties of esteem and friendship are strengthening between English and Dutch. The percentage of citizens who can only speak one of the official languages is becoming smaller every year. There are now few barriers to social intercourse. Sport, and especially the national game of Rugby Football, has been a potent link of comradeship.

The alluring climate makes South Africa a pleasant land for the white man. Moreover, within the European community, there are no sharp contrasts of wealth and poverty. Nearly all are tolerably well-to-do. There are no leisured classes ; and so far the Union has been able to find unskilled employment for a large proportion of the "poor whites." Life is easy because it is built upon the basis of black labour. Unlike Australia and New Zealand, the Union has no servant problem. Lastly, there is the singular charm of the country itself. True, there is an absence of running water and a scarcity of foliage and verdure on the tableland which makes up the vast interior

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of South Africa. But, to compensate for these limitations, there is the richness of tone of the landscape in the keen dry air of the elevated plateau. The observer is impressed by the delicacy of outline of the fantastically-formed kopjies with their masses of grey granite, seen in the clear light against the softer outline of the more distant ranges. The appeal of the South African veld lies chiefly in its immensity and its solitude. The want of greenness and of variety in the landscape helps to produce that impressive simplicity which, to the South African, is not far short of perfection. There may not be beauty, and, outside the sub-tropical coastlands of the South-East, there is no luxuriance of vegetation. South Africa is not a land of rich pastures and waving cornlands. But there is boldness of outline on the wind-swept veld, a rare harmony of form and colour which delights the eye. Everything is on a grand scale. Such a land may well inspire a people to great achievements.

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